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Foreword
This report sums up the International 
Center for Innovation (ICI) project, 
which has focused on the use of business 
models. 
Efforts from all the people involved in 
the project, researchers as well as firm 
managers and personnel, have benefited 
this report. In particular, ICI Center 
Director Professor John Johansen 
has helped to structure and refine the 
presentations and argumentations in 
this report. 
Further inquiries concerning the ICI 
project should be directed to him.1 
1 Professor John Johansen, E-mail: jj@business.aau.dk , Phone: +4599408995, Center for Industrial Production, 
Department of Business and Management, Aalborg University, Fibigerstræde 10, 9220 Aalborg Ø, Denmark. 
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The ICI project was supported by 
the North Denmark Region (http://
www.rn.dk/Regionen/English/) and 
granted a total budget of DKK 63 
million of which 50% was provided 
by the European Structural Funds 
and the remainder was co-financed 
from the companies involved and 
Aalborg University.
This report emphasizes key as-
pects of more than five years’ work, 
spanning 10 networks consisting of 
nearly 100 individual organizations 
in total2. Aside from the personnel 
involved through the participating 
firms, a host of researchers, master 
students, consultants, and knowl-
edge partners were involved in 
executing the project.
Originally, the ICI project was meant 
to include 15 networks, and thus 
have a larger scope. However, the 
financial crisis in 2008 and onwards 
had serious ramifications for the 
general willingness to invest and 
participate in the ICI project. Ac-
cordingly, the ICI project was scaled 
down to the final 10 networks.
The primary aim of the project was 
to promote innovation and growth 
with business models. Concisely, 
this was viewed as a method of 
supplanting the customary prod-
uct-focused innovation tradition-
ally employed in projects aimed 
at promoting growth. Thus, the 
business model perspective stands 
at the heart of the ICI undertaking 
as the central frame through which 
firms, novel concepts, and ideas are 
understood. Accordingly, the suc-
cess criteria for ICI are to implement 
tools and methods for better un-
derstanding business models, while 
using the concept to drive business 
development and growth in Northern 
Jutland.
The ICI project also contains a dis-
tinct sub-theme related to network 
creation, as a way of enriching 
the business model development 
process and enabling new ways of 
creating and delivering products or 
services. The network ambition is 
thus viewed as part of the business 
model goal. This project takes steps 
to merge a network and a business 
model perspective in promoting 
trade. Thus, although the network 
aspect is distinct on its own, it is 
used here in relation to business 
models. The business model con-
cept is therefore the focal point of 
the project.
Initially, the central concepts of the 
project are presented to provide the 
reader with the prerequisite under-
standing of the key terms involved. 
First, the business model concept, 
as used in the ICI project, is pre-
sented and defined. Second, the 
network aspect is presented and 
defined. These concepts combine 
to form the frame and the premise 
for the ICI project. Consequently, 
the frame provides the foundation 
for the report, including the prereq-
uisite understanding of the central 
concepts. Central to the overall ICI 
project is the pragmatic goal to pro-
vide practical and usable results and 
insights for businesses.
Introduction 
to the ICI project
The International Center for Innovation (ICI) project started in 2008, as an ambitious 
undertaking, with a unique structure. The purpose was to use a format, in which 
research and practice would be seen as an integrated whole, thus providing the 
organizations much closer ties to the most recent research and the assistance needed to 
implement it. The project had two goals: pertaining to driving growth and harvesting 
new insights.
ICI Project Report
Introduction
2 Nine of a total of 10 network cases have been included in this report and in the case book. It has not been possible within the available time 
frame to obtain authorization to print the last network case. 
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The 10 network cases are then pre-
sented in alphabetical order, using 
this framework. The cases provide 
insights into the network and busi-
ness model–related developments 
each network experienced. The 
presentation of the cases emphasiz-
es the actions performed by the ICI, 
viewed through the lens of the de-
fined framework. The cases form the 
empirical foundation for the results 
of the project.
Subsequently, the results of the 
project are presented, related 
to the following points:
- Promotion of trade
- Insights and learning points 
related to
- Business models
- The intersection between 
business models and net-
worksbusiness models and 
networks
The promotion of trade presents the 
economic results, as a means of 
gauging the success of the project, 
based on the economic develop-
ment spurred by the ICI endeavor. 
This is followed by results related to 
the combined use of business mod-
el and network perspectives. This 
will emphasize the learning points 
related to these two aspects and the 
interplay between them. Finally, the 
results are summarized in the con-
clusions section, which concisely 
presents the two lines of results.
Following the conclusions, relevant 
limitations of the report are present-
ed. These lead to further consid-
erations, which may influence the 
results. The limitations have been 
included as they provide further in-
teresting insights for academics and 
business model practitioners alike, 
albeit on the periphery of this pro-
ject. Last, the findings of the report 
are presented as practical insights 
targeted at managers and business 
model practitioners. 
Introduction
Central concepts
- Business models
- Networks
Case presentations
Results
- Promotion of trade
- Learning points
Conclusions
Limitations
Advice to managers
Figure 1: Report structure
The ICI project was structured in 10 networks, each consisting of at least 
five independent partners. Of the 10 ICI networks, three have resulted 
in profit-generating businesses, one has scaled down its operations 
significantly, one is bankrupt, and five are still exploring the potential of 
their business models. 
In 2012, the combined revenue of 
the 10 networks was DKK 24.945 M 
for the activities in relation to the ICI 
project. The related profits are DKK 
2.490 M. In terms of employment, by 
the end of 2012, the project generat-
ed 21.5 full-time equivalents (FTEs). 
The networks anticipate that these 
numbers will increase during the 
coming years to combined revenues 
of DKK 293 M, combined profits 
of DKK 56.850 M, and a total of 43 
FTEs in 2015. These numbers are of 
course uncertain. The results have 
been created due to the investment 
of approximately DKK 63 M in the 
ICI project. A somewhat surprising 
positive side effect, is that the ICI 
project has helped accelerate the 
involved firms’ individual business 
models, and sharpen their skills 
in terms of being part of networks 
when implementing business mod-
els.
This report presents the develop-
ment of 10 ICI networks, according 
to a pragmatic framework based 
on the concepts business models 
and networks. The premise of the 
project was network-based business 
models. A network-based business 
model is a business model shared 
among the actors in a network. 
However, rather than focusing on 
this business model, aiming for 
compatible business models in 
networks makes more sense. Based 
on the data from the cases, orches-
trating the compatibility of business 
models across many partners in a 
network is difficult. As the number 
of partners increases, the need for 
a core firm to drive and organize 
the process increases as well. The 
core challenge of business models 
in networks can be summed up as 
maximizing relevant complemen-
tarity among the network partners 
without jeopardizing business model 
compatibility. 
The conclusions outlined in this re-
port are moderated by the fact that 
many of the networks worked with 
new products or services, which 
had not been defined. This made 
implementing and testing the busi-
ness models difficult, and made the 
premise of network-based business 
models more difficult to implement. 
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Central 
concepts
This section presents the key concepts re-
lated to the ICI project (business models 
and networks), as well as the connection 
and interaction between them. The central 
premise was to build network-based busi-
ness models. 
This notion emphasizes building a shared 
business model at the network level. This 
premise is depicted in Figure 2.
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Business model
Firm 1
Firm 2Firm 3
Figure 2: The network-business model premise of the ICI project
The business model concept serves as a lens through which the cases 
are presented. Understanding this concept is therefore a cornerstone for 
understanding the cases and their development. The notion of networks is 
also presented, as it is central to the goal of ICI.
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Chesbrough (2007) defines a business model as a framework 
for linking ideas and technologies to economic outcomes that has value in 
understanding how companies of all sizes can convert technological potential into 
economic value. He also states that every company has a business model even if 
it is not articulated.
Chesbrough (2007) defines a busi-
ness model as a framework for 
linking ideas and technologies to 
economic outcomes that has value 
in understanding how companies 
of all sizes can convert technolog-
ical potential into economic value. 
He also states that every company 
has a business model even if it is 
not articulated. Magretta (2002) 
describes business models as 
stories that explain how the en-
terprises work, and as something 
that describes, as a system, how 
the pieces of a business fit togeth-
er disregarding competition. She 
outlines two conditions for good 
business models: First, the model 
must have good logic in terms of 
customers, their value, and how 
the company can make money by 
providing them that value. Second, 
the business model must generate 
profit. Although the business model 
concept has undergone significant 
academic development in recent 
years, this development has mainly 
broadened the concept (Günzel and 
Wilker, 2009; Morris et al., 2005). In 
other words, the conceptual base 
of business models is still thin (Zott 
et al., 2011). Operationalizing and 
working practically with broad and 
vaguely defined concepts is difficult. 
Business models have also been 
defined as “the rationale of how an 
organization creates, delivers and 
captures value” (Osterwalder and 
Pigneur, 2010; 14). This definition 
of business models is broad to the 
extent that it is difficult to distinguish 
the field of business models from 
innovation management, operations 
management, marketing, and strat-
egy, since many overlaps with these 
fields seem to exist. It is therefore 
relevant to carve out more clearly 
what constitutes the core of busi-
ness models, to make the concept 
usable for companies. Accordingly, 
the ICI project adopted a working 
definition of business models that 
focuses on capturing value in the 
sense that the focus is on the type 
of revenue streams in relation to 
business models. A key reason for 
this choice is that revenue streams 
are something the companies can 
more easily relate to as the revenue 
streams seem to constitute a key 
part of the success of the following 
well-known examples:
- Xerox and Tetra Pak, with 
their emphasis on cheap 
initial equipment investments, 
followed by usage fees, 
commonly referred to as the 
“Xerox model.”
- Similarly, Gillette and various 
consumer printer manufac-
turers (HP, Canon, Lexmark, 
Epson) sell part of their value 
proposition cheaply in terms 
of an asset sale, and in sub-
sequent asset sales, other 
parts of the value proposition 
are sold in terms of asset 
sales at a higher price. This 
is sometimes referred to as a 
“bait and hook” model.
- Google is an example of ad-
vertisement revenue streams 
in which the company pro-
vides a free search engine 
and free content, such as 
YouTube. The revenue is then 
generated through advertising 
to the users who freely use 
the services. This is some-
times referred to as a “free” 
model.
Business models
ICI Project Report
Central concepts › Business Models
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- Various e-businesses such as 
Skype or Dropbox provide a 
basic product free, while pre-
mium or extra features cost 
extra, thus ensuring the reve-
nue streams. These showcase 
what is sometimes referred to 
as a “freemium” model.
 
In summary, by making revenue 
streams the focal point of business 
models, the concept becomes more 
tangible and thus can be investigat-
ed. This model is better suited for 
delivering a practical contribution. 
Although revenue streams are at the 
core of a business model, equat-
ing revenue streams and business 
models is an oversimplification. The 
type of revenue streams must be 
understood in relation to the busi-
ness configuration of the firm, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) 
describes business models mak-
ing use of a canvas, consisting of 
different building blocks, which are 
illustrated in Figure 4. When the 
term “business configuration” is 
used in this report, the term refers 
to all the building blocks of the 
canvas except “revenue streams.” 
This building block is treated on its 
own due to its particular importance 
in business model work. Therefore, 
in the following, revenue streams 
are outlined first. Subsequently, the 
other building blocks of the canvas 
are described. 
Osterwalder and Pigneur’s (2010) 
canvas was chosen since it is easy 
to understand and easy to use. 
Thus, it is well aligned with the goal 
of this report.
Figure 3: Business model as the logic between revenue streams and business configuration
Revenue streams Business conguration
Key 
Partners
Key 
Activities
Value 
Proposition
Customer 
Relationships
Customer 
Segments
 
Key 
Resources Channels
Cost 
Structure   
Revenue 
Structure 
Figure 4: The canvas (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010)
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Asset sale refers to a simple trans-
action between the customers and 
a firm. 
Usage fee is concerned with charg-
ing a fee each time the product or 
service is used. 
Subscription gives continuous 
access to a service through a sub-
scription payment.
Lending/Renting/Leasing is pay-
ment for granting the customer the 
right to use an asset for a limited 
amount of time.
Licensing gives the customer the 
right to use a piece of intellectual 
property in exchange for a fee.
Brokerage fees refer to charging 
a fee for providing intermediate 
service in a transaction between two 
other parties.
Advertisement is characterized by 
relying on advertisers for revenue.
These types of revenue streams can 
also be combined. This assertion is 
perhaps best illuminated by direct-
ing attention toward various trend-
setting business models described 
earlier in the form of Xerox, Tetra 
Pak, Gillette, various printer manu-
facturers, Google, Skype, and Drop-
box. The common theme among 
these examples is their strong focus 
on creating alternative methods of 
generating and sustaining revenue 
streams. Below, additional types of 
revenue streams are outlined.
Revenue 
Streams
At the core of a business model is a revenue stream. The type of revenue  
stream refers to how a firm’s income can be characterized, in other words,  
“how customers pay.” There are seven basic types of revenue streams:
ICI Project Report
Central concepts › Business Models › Revenue streams
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Excluding the building block “revenue streams,” a business configuration can be 
described in terms of the eight remaining building blocks of the canvas (Figure 4):
Business configuration 
and descriptors
ICI Project Report
Central concepts › Business Models › Business configuration and descriptors
Although the canvas represents 
a common structure or template 
through which business models can 
be represented, the canvas does not 
facilitate comparisons. The number 
of possible descriptions of each 
building block is nearly endless. The 
consequence of using such descrip-
tions would be a total of N9 different 
configurations, where N represents 
the range of possible descriptions 
each building block could abide by. 
Therefore, to facilitate comparisons 
between business models, the 
expression of the configuration must 
be simplified, by limiting the num-
ber of possible descriptions under 
each building block. Osterwalder 
and Pigneur (2010) provide broad 
descriptors, which will be used. 
Henceforth, the term descriptors, 
in this report, refers to descriptive 
categories applied to each individual 
building block. Later, these building 
blocks are used in the presentation 
of the cases. 
·         Customer Segments
·         Value Proposition
·         Channels
·         Customer Relationships
·         Key Resources
·         Key Activities
·         Key Partners
·         Cost Structure
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Mass market relates to a very large 
number of customers who have very 
similar needs. The customers are 
therefore considered one homoge-
nous group.
Niche market focuses on very 
specific customer needs, directed 
toward very specific customers with 
unique needs compared to the mass 
market.
Segmented is concerned with 
serving several unique customer 
or market segments with different 
needs but relate to the same core 
product or service.
Diversified relates to serving com-
pletely different products or servic-
es, potentially to completely different 
customers.
Multi-sided platforms work by 
serving two or more distinctly dif-
ferent and independent customer 
segments, but the business model 
depends on both segments.
Customer Segments
Customer segments concern the customers the business configuration aims 
to serve. The aim is therefore to characterize the customers. Osterwalder and 
Pigneur (2010) present the following classifications:
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Newness concerns satisfying a new 
need.
Customization relates to the ability to 
tailor the product to customers’ specif-
ic needs and wants.
“Getting the job done” concerns 
when customers source certain activ-
ities or areas to focus on something 
else. 
Design is related to products that 
stand out because of superior design 
and appearance.
Brand/Status creates value for cus-
tomers simply by using and displaying 
certain brands.
Price relates to selling customers a 
product that is similar but cheaper than 
competing products.
Cost reduction focuses on enabling 
cost savings that are not directly 
accredited to the product, but to other 
parts of the customers’ organization.
Risk reduction considers reducing the 
risk for the customers, for instance, 
through guarantees.
Accessibility concerns making existing 
but previously unavailable products 
and services available for customers.
Convenience/Usability concerns 
making existing service or product 
offerings more convenient and/or easy 
to use.
Speed is concerned with whether the 
products and services give customers 
a speed advantage. 
Speed is not a descriptor that Oster-
walder and Pigneur (2010) outline in 
relation to value propositions. Oper-
ations management considers speed 
one of the five commonly mentioned 
performance objectives (quality, speed, 
dependability, flexibility, and cost). 
Therefore, evaluating whether speed 
is accounted for by other descriptors 
of value proposition is relevant. One 
can of course argue that performance 
objectives and value propositions are 
not necessarily the same. However, 
overlaps between these two concepts 
exist, which makes it relevant to relate 
these two concepts to each other as 
shown in Table 1.
Value Proposition
In terms of the value proposition, Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) have outlined 
many descriptors. In particular, the descriptor concerning performance 
(improvement of product or service as a way of creating value) seems redundant 
as all other value proposition descriptors might also somehow describe 
performance in one aspect or another. The descriptor performance has therefore 
been left out. 
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Table 1: Relations between performance objectives outlined by Slack et al. (2004) and value proposition descriptors 
outlined by Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010)
In Table 1, the 11 descriptors outlined by Osterwalder 
and Pigneur (2010) in relation to the building block 
“value proposition” are related to the five performance 
objectives commonly used in operations management, 
which has been described by Slack et al. (2004). Table 
1 shows that the numerous descriptors outlined by 
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) in relation to the build-
ing block “value proposition” disregard the performance 
objective “speed.” Speed is therefore included as an 
additional descriptor in relation to value propositions. 
When investigating Table 1, only the descriptor “risk re-
duction” relates somewhat to the performance objective 
“dependability.” However, dependability is not included 
here as an additional descriptor, as this descriptor does 
not seem to be relevant for describing the cases used in 
this report. 
Performance objectives by Slack et al. (2004) Value proposition descriptors by Osterwalder and 
Pigneur (2010)
 - Quality  - Newness
 - Performance
 - “Getting the job done”
 - Design
 - Brand/Status
 - Accessbility
 - Convenience/Usability
 - Speed
 - Dependability  - Risk reduction
 - Flexibility  - Customization
 - Cost  - Price
 - Cost reduction
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Sales force is having sales person-
nel directly in charge of selling the 
product to customers.
Web sales refers to customers vis-
iting the firm’s website to place their 
order.
Own stores is having a dedicated 
store where customers can choose 
the product.
Partner stores refers to using 
partner stores to promote and sell 
products or services.
Wholesaler relates to selling from 
the shelves of already established 
sales outlets.
Channels
Channels refer to the means of sales and distribution through which the product or 
service reaches the target customers. The descriptors are as follows:
ICI Project Report
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Personal assistance is based on 
face-to-face interaction with cus-
tomers and a high degree of cus-
tomized guidance for the individual 
customer.
Dedicated personal assistance 
describes when a customer repre-
sentative is specifically dedicated to 
an individual client.
Self-service gives the customers 
the means to help themselves to the 
product or service they need without 
interaction.
Automated service refers to auto-
matically offering specific customers 
specific services or products based 
on their characteristics, typically 
through IT systems.
Communities are built on the idea 
of connecting customers more 
directly to each other, to gain more 
insight into their needs and wants 
and allow customers to help each 
other.
Co-creation is based on getting 
users involved in creating and 
moderating products, services, or 
products.
Customer Relationships
Customer Relationships refers to the characteristic of the relationship the firm has 
with its customers, namely, at the point of sale. The relationship can be described 
as follows:
ICI Project Report
Central concepts › Business Models › Business configuration and descriptors
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Physical refers to physical assets 
such as machinery, buildings, etc.
Intellectual relates to resources 
such as brands, proprietary knowl-
edge, patents and copyright part-
nerships, and customer databases.
Human concerns the need for hu-
man capital to generate knowledge 
and drive creativity, with an empha-
sis on knowledge and competences.
Financial relates to business con-
figurations built on specific financial 
resources at disposal.
Key Resources
Key resources refer to the resources necessary for implementing and sustaining 
the business configuration. This relates to which resources are needed to generate 
(manufacture, procure, etc.) the value proposition and deliver it to customers 
(sales, relations, networks). Accordingly, the following descriptors are provided:
ICI Project Report
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Production is related to manufac-
turing and delivering products.
Problem solving refers to solving 
specific problems and coming up 
with solutions.
Platform/Network is characteristic 
of firms that rely on their network to 
support their business model. Thus, 
the category refers to building and 
maintaining a platform that connects 
multiple outside actors to the firm’s 
business model.
Additional descriptors of key activi-
ties might be relevant. For instance, 
sourcing as a key activity might be 
relevant in relation to certain compa-
nies. However, to describe the cases 
in this report, the three key activities 
are sufficient.
Key Activities
Key activities are the activities performed internally by the firm that are essential 
for the business configuration; for instance, accounting is not a key activity. The 
key activities are therefore described using the following terms:
ICI Project Report
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Optimization and economy of 
scale is the exercise of choosing 
which activities should be out-
sourced to external suppliers, which 
can achieve significantly lower costs 
and/or higher quality.
Reduction of risk and uncertainty 
through alliances: partners can re-
duce some of the risk factors related 
to new products by ensuring back-
ing and support.
Acquisition of particular resources 
and activities refers to engaging 
partner companies that possess key 
components or pieces of knowledge 
needed to realize the value proposi-
tion.
For certain companies, it would be 
relevant to partner up with others to 
obtain optimization in terms of econ-
omy of scope, and not only in terms 
of economy of scale. Sometimes, 
including an additional descriptor of 
key partners may be relevant: “op-
timization and economy of scope.” 
However, such an adaptation of 
the framework seems redundant in 
terms of describing the cases in this 
report. Therefore, no further descrip-
tors of key partners are included.
Key Partners
Key partners are partners that are necessary to maintain the business 
configuration. The following descriptors provide descriptions of the reasoning for 
involving specific partners:
ICI Project Report
Central concepts › Business Models › Business configuration and descriptors
IC
I 
P
ro
je
ct
 R
ep
or
t 
B
us
in
es
s 
M
od
el
s 
in
 N
et
w
or
ks
/29
Cost-driven businesses focus on 
minimizing costs wherever possible.
Value-driven businesses focus 
on maximizing value creation, for 
instance, through personalized 
service.
Fixed costs imply that the business 
configuration is largely based on a 
fixed cost structure, under which the 
amount of goods or services deliv-
ered has little effect on the overall 
costs.
Variable costs relate to a configura-
tion under which the cost is mostly 
directly related to the amount of 
goods or services produced.
Economies of scale refers to a 
structure under which the variable 
costs are seen as inversely related 
to the amount of goods or services 
produced, which implies that the 
marginal costs will decrease as the 
volume increases.
Economies of scope relates to 
exploiting the same operations to 
support multiple products, thus de-
creasing the costs associated with 
each product line.
Cost Structure
Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) outline six dimensions of cost structure: 
ICI Project Report
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Figure 5: Canvas with descriptors according to Osterwalder and Pigneur 2010 where “speed” has been included, 
and performance has been excluded, as descriptors in relation to value proposition
Table 2 and Figure 5 provide an 
overview of the descriptors included 
in relation to each building block, 
including revenue streams. The only 
adaptation made to Osterwalder 
and Pigneur’s (2010) list is that 
speed has been included in relation 
to value propositions.
  Key 
 Partners
 - Optimization and 
economy of scale
 - Reduction of risk and 
uncertainty
 - Acquisition of 
particular resources 
and activities
 Key  
 Activities
 - Production
 - Problem solving
 - Platform/Network
 Value  
 Proposition
 - Newness
 - Customization
 - “Getting the job done”
 - Design
 - Brand/Status
 - Price
 - Cost reduction
 - Risk reduction
 - Accessibility
 - Convenience/Usability
 - Speed
 Customer 
  
Relationships
 - Personal assistance
 - Dedicated personal 
assistance
 - Self service
 - Automated service
 - Communities
 - Co-creation
 Customer  
 Segments
 - Mass market
 - Niche market
 - Segmented
 - Diversified
 - Multi-sided platforms
 Key  
 Resources
 - Physical
 - Intellectual
 - Human
 - Financial
 Channels
 - Sales force
 - Web sales
 - Own stores
 - Partner stores
 - Wholesaler
  Cost Structure
 - Cost-driven
 - Value driven
 - Fixed costs
 - Variable costs
 - Economies of scale
 - Economies of scope
 Revenue Structure
 - Asset sale
 - Usage sale
 - Subscription fees
 - Lending/Renting/Leasing
 - Leasing
 - Brokerage fees
 - Advertising
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Table 2: Overview of the descriptors for each building block
Revenue 
Streams
Asset sale Usage fee Subscription 
fees
Lending/
renting/leas-
ing
Licensing Brokerage 
fees
Advertis-
ing
Customer 
segments
Mass market Niche mar-
ket
Segmented Diversified Multi-sided 
platforms
Value 
Proposition
Newness Customiza-
tion
“Getting the 
job done”
Design Brand/Sta-
tus
Price Cost re-
duction
Risk reduc-
tion
Accessibility Conveni-
ence/Usa-
bility
Speed
Channels Sales force Web sales Own stores Partner 
stores
Whole-sale
Customer 
Relationships
Personal 
assistance
Dedicated 
personal 
assistance
Self-service Automated 
service
Communi-
ties
Co-creation
Revenue 
Streams
Asset Sale Usage fee Subscription Lending/
Renting/
Leasing
Licensing Brokerage 
fees
Advertis-
ing
Key 
Resources
Physical Intellectual Human Financial
Key 
Activities
Production Problem 
solving
Platform/ 
network
Key 
Partners
Optimization 
and econo-
my of scale
Reduction 
of risk and 
uncertainty
Acquisition 
of particular 
resources 
and activ-
ities
Cost 
Structure
Value driven Cost driven Fixed costs Variable 
costs
Economies 
of scale
Economies 
of scope
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The cases of the ICI project are organized in networks, pertaining to the 
development of a particular business model of a network; see Figure 2. Thus, 
network is a key concept in the ICI project. The pervading understanding used in 
relation to networks and their characteristics are presented, to further explain the 
premise for the network focus in the ICI project. 
The cases of the ICI project are 
organized in networks, pertaining to 
the development of a particular busi-
ness model of a network; see Figure 
2. Thus, network is a key concept 
in the ICI project. The pervading 
understanding used in relation to 
networks and their characteristics 
are presented, to further explain the 
premise for the network focus in the 
ICI project.
In keeping with the practical goal 
of the report, networks are defined 
as collaboration between actors, 
namely, individual firms. In keep-
ing with the building blocks of the 
business configuration, an organi-
zation can be described in terms of 
activities and resources. A network 
is therefore a format for bringing 
together resources and activities 
across different actors. Consequent-
ly, a network is comprised of actors, 
activities, and resources (Håkans-
son, 1987), as illustrated in Figure 6. 
Most networks are bound together 
by common non-conflicting inter-
ests, and in the ICI project, “busi-
ness model thinking” was used as a 
driver and tool to identify common 
non-conflicting interests.
Thus, the actors are companies 
collaborating to some extent. In this 
text, the term partner is used specif-
ically to describe actors participat-
ing in a given network. 
Networks can be a means for realiz-
ing synergies among the partners in 
the network. For instance, new and 
Networks
ICI Project Report
Central concepts › Business Models
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improved value creation and delivery 
processes can be created by com-
bining the knowledge and compe-
tences of the actors in a network. 
This definition does not make any 
presumptions regarding the level 
of engagement exhibited by the 
partners or the methods by which 
the partners interact. Networks can 
differ in terms of how integrated the 
partners are, ranging from simple 
transactional relationships to more 
advanced forms of networks in 
which risks are shared, etc. 
The premise of the ICI project was 
to work with network-based busi-
ness models, as initially depicted in 
Figure 2. A network-based business 
model is a business model shared 
among the actors in a network. 
Figure 6: The basic elements of a network
Activities
Actors
Resources
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Case 
presentations 
The following case presentations describe 
the actions undertaken by ICI in each net-
work. For a more detailed view of the cas-
es, the book of cases is available. Each case 
starts with a short introduction presenting 
a brief snapshot of when the specific net-
work was initiated. 
ICI Project Report
Case presentations
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Although the ICI project focused on network-based 
business models, the results illustrate that these busi-
ness models are difficult in practice. A reinterpretation is 
needed. Consequently, each case description presents 
the core firm’s business model.
Subsequently, the case presentations provide a short 
description of specific issues to provide a frame of 
understanding for the associated ICI actions undertaken 
with the network. Whenever possible, these are pre-
sented in chronological order. This is followed by a short 
description of the tools or insights the individual network 
gained from the actions. Each case description ends 
with an illustration of the canvas and the changes that 
occurred throughout the ICI project within the different 
building blocks, including revenue streams. These illus-
trations are only snapshots illustrating the end states 
in particular, and to some extent the initial state of the 
business model. 
Last, the effect on trade promotion is presented for the 
network (except for EBB, and Space Creator), to gauge 
the economic effect of the specific network endeavor. 
This effect is presented in terms of revenue, profit, num-
ber of employees, and investments. As an indication of 
the financial results of the participating companies thus 
far, numbers for the following periods are presented: 
1. The time the network was active during the ICI 
project
a. Revenue generated (core business)
b. Profit generated (core business)
c. Full-time equivalents (FTEs) on the project 
(including partners)
d. Investments (also partners if they have 
invested)
2. Results for 2012 and outlook for 2013, 2014, and 
2015
a. Revenue (core business)
b. Profit (core business)
c. Number of employees (including partners 
where applicable)
The figures for 2012 are presented as a measure of the 
latest available data for the networks. For some net-
works, the latest developments have been without ICI 
involvement, while others were involved with ICI until the 
end of the project, 2012. 
Two years is often not sufficient for building, testing, and 
implementing a new business model and viewing the 
subsequent results, which is why more speculative data 
on expectations are inserted. As recognition of this, the 
expected growth figures are presented to provide some 
insight into the potential future growth resulting from the 
groundwork done in collaboration with ICI.
Figure 7: Illustration of trade promotion
(*) These numbers are reported only for the focal firm. For revenue, this is done to avoid the same revenue being summed multiple times, 
through goods moving through different partners. For results, the figures for the partners are quite difficult to assess and are confidential to 
some extent.
(**) These figures are reported at the network level to gauge the economic effect derived from the single network.
Network timeframe 2012 totals 2013-2015 expectations
Revenue* Revenue* Projected revenue*
Result* Result* Projected results*
FTE** Employees** Projected employees**
Investments**
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Whereas competitors such as AFA JCDecaux and Clear Channel have to plan, 
produce, distribute, and put up posters, the Cspot network was created to create 
a completely new medium, consisting of advertising monitors placed in shop 
windows, using a different cost structure.
Cspot
Through an Internet connec-
tion, the content presented on 
the monitors could quickly be 
changed thus providing instant 
advertising. The central idea 
was to enable cheap dynamic 
outdoor advertising, targeted 
at small- and medium-sized 
businesses. 
When the Cspot network was 
launched, one of the first activities 
was to map out Cspot’s business 
model, using the business model 
canvas. This provided the firm with 
the tools needed to explain the 
business model and spawned a 
range of ideas for how the concept 
could create other revenue streams. 
The business model also highlighted 
weaknesses in the business that 
would have to be addressed. 
In terms of revenue streams, Cspot 
relied on usage fees, in which 
the customers pay for minutes of 
screen-time. The price depended on 
the time of the day. 
Cspot initially emphasized its hands-
off approach, under which the 
company would interact little with 
customers. The aim was to create a 
wholly automated system, in which 
the firm would perform a minimum 
of activities with each sale. The goal 
was for the firm only to approve the 
content presented on the monitors. 
With the Cspot system, advertisers 
simply go to the Cspot website. 
Here, advertisers choose where and 
when to show their campaign. The 
advertiser either uploads existing 
material or uses the free online spot 
builder. This enables customers to 
advertise instantly and relevantly. 
For example, a local restaurant 
could put out an offer instantly, if it is 
a slow night, or if the weather turns 
to rain. A local department store can 
attract customers with an advan-
tageous offer. The cost structure 
is also different. In addition to the 
obvious savings of the production 
and distribution cost of a static me-
dium, Cspot came up with a clever 
model that drastically reduced in-
frastructure costs. Competitors AFA 
JCDecaux and Clear Channel have 
high costs placing billboards on the 
sides of houses or paying for public 
exteriors.
Cspot attracted more than 100 sites 
based on the model: “your window 
space and power in exchange for a 
quantity of free advertising on the 
system in your local area.” In fact, 
the only cost for Cspot was the 
screen setup, maintenance, and 
Global System for Mobile Commu-
Case presentations
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nications (GSM) Internet connection. 
Cspot had difficulty attracting large 
advertisers, which often are man-
aged by advertising agencies. The 
large advertisers did not want to talk 
with Cspot before they could offer 
something countrywide. Hence, 
Cspot invested heavily in order to 
become able to deliver commercials 
countrywide. The large advertisers 
also wanted documentation of the 
effect and the number of people 
who view the screens. A solution 
was discussed to install surveillance 
at every Cspot, providing automatic 
counting. But the investment was 
simply too high. ICI also facilitated 
contact with BLIP (described later 
in relation to the Mobile Tracking 
network). BLIP was willing to use its 
technology to provide Cspot with 
the effect validation needed. Howev-
er, Cspot did not trust BLIP to do it.
Later, Cspot moved from a self-ser-
vice customer relationship to per-
sonal assistance. The company also 
changed from web sales to a sales 
force, as illustrated in Figure 8. 
Early in the process, ICI pointed 
out the need to initiate a search 
for system validation methods, to 
prove effectiveness. The idea was 
to quantify the value proposition to 
attract customers. Accordingly, an 
introduction to effect measurement 
was held in the spring of 2010. The 
dialogue continued throughout the 
network timeframe, and Cspot had 
meetings with Lindberg Internation-
al and Gallup, both effect analysis 
suppliers. However, Cspot rejected 
the initiative, as the firm emphasized 
the need to use a highly reputable 
analysis company. This made the 
investment in such data too expen-
sive. 
The mapping of the business model 
made it evident that a partnership 
approach would be highly beneficial 
for the concept. The right partners 
would be able to strengthen and 
extend the concept in new ways, 
which could help drive up the value 
of the concept, and thus further its 
adoption. This realization spurred 
collaboration with TV2 news, which 
agreed to provide news content for 
the platform. Cspot thus sought to 
increase the attractiveness of the 
monitors, as they could then also 
provide public service.
When the first monitors were in-
stalled, problems with reflections 
were revealed during high direct 
sunlight, which caused the monitors 
to appear completely dark. Due to 
this, ICI facilitated contact with the 
Institute of Nano-technology at Aal-
borg University, to create a solution 
to overcome or reduce the reflection 
issues. However, significant research 
was already being conducted within 
the field, and was of a high technical 
complexity. Furthermore, the po-
tential for such a solution would be 
many orders of magnitude greater 
than what Cspot could use it for. 
Cspot decided to wait for a suitable 
technology to emerge.
The mapping of the 
business model made it 
evident that a partnership 
approach would be highly 
beneficial for the concept.
internetSender Recipient
distribution
MESSAGE
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At the same time, Cspot struggled 
to maintain its operations, due to a 
lack of sales. This made Cspot part-
ner up with an external sales firm, 
based on the assumption that once 
the concept became well-known, 
the sales process would become 
self-sustaining. This represented a 
break from the previous model, and 
would prove to have dire conse-
quences, as the firm did not realign 
its revenue streams and business 
configuration accordingly. Cspot 
still believed that a critical mass of 
customers would make a sales or-
ganization obsolete at a later stage. 
Thus, inquiries from ICI to reconsid-
er the entire business were rejected. 
In late 2011, the Cspot project was 
assigned a new academic manager. 
This led to a more operations-fo-
cused approach to the project from 
ICI. The aim was to streamline the 
entire operations and sales organi-
zation, and to make it more efficient. 
Thus, best practices were docu-
mented, and it became possible 
to convey a consistent marketing 
message. The process included an 
analysis of the entire sales process 
from initial customer contact to final 
invoice, to reduce handling costs.
Furthermore, ICI worked with Cspot 
to create a program for ensuring 
that the best sales personnel were 
retained. In particular, the focus was 
to keep the experienced personnel 
who knew the concept well. In a 
similar vein, marketing material for 
the concept was created, aimed at 
providing the sales organization with 
the prerequisite tools for actually 
selling the product to customers. 
Integral to these efforts were consid-
erations about which types of mar-
keting messages could be conveyed 
through the Cspot media.
Additionally, an ambitious project 
to categorize all the monitors ac-
cording to their attractiveness was 
started together with ICI, where ICI 
provided input on how the classi-
fication should be constructed, to 
remove bad locations and search 
more diligently for good locations. 
This also led to considerations on 
whether good locations should pro-
vide higher payment to the location 
owners, as a method of increasing 
the value of the concept.
Last, together with ICI, Cspot began 
working on providing customers 
with a more appropriate segmenta-
tion of the monitors and methods 
of presenting the segmentation in a 
simple yet understandable manner. 
This was to ensure that the loca-
tion monitors used were the most 
relevant for the spot in question, 
based on different parameters, thus 
maximizing the effect of the market-
ing investment.
As mentioned earlier, Cspot did not 
change its type of revenue stream, 
although the company made some 
presumed temporary changes to 
parts of its business model configu-
ration. However, these intermediate 
changes did not have the antici-
pated effect. The customers were 
interested in the concept, but unable 
to deliver their own needed con-
tent. The large advertisers were also 
interested in the concept, however 
the price was too low, and since 
they get paid in terms of a percent-
age of their customers advertising 
engagements, they had little interest 
in making Cspot a success. Con-
sequently, Cspot went bankrupt. 
(Cspot also serves as empirical 
background in the following ICI pub-
lication: Lund (2012).)
Case presentations
Additionally, an ambitious project to categorize all the monitors according 
to their attractiveness was started together with ICI, where ICI provided 
input on how the classification should be constructed, to remove bad 
locations and search more diligently for good locations. 
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Figure 8: The Cspot business model
Figure 9: Illustration of trade promotion
  Key 
 Partners
 - Acquisition of 
particular resources or 
activities
 Key  
 Activities
 - Platform/network
 Value  
 Proposition
 - Speed and price
 Customer 
  
Relationships
 - From self service to 
personal assistance
 Customer  
 Segments
 - Mass market
 Key  
 Resources
 - From intellectual to 
physical
 Channels
 - From web sales to 
sales force
  Cost Structure
 - Fixed costs
 Revenue Structure
 - Usage fee
Network timeframe 2012 totals 2013-2015 expectations
Revenue: 
-
Revenue: 
-
Projected revenue: 
0
Result: 
-5,483 tDKK
Result: 
-
Projected results: 
0
FTE: 
-
Employees: 
0
Projected employees: 
0
Investments: 
-
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The network Energirigtigt og Bæredygtigt Byggeri (EBB) was created to develop 
a business model in relation to an ongoing innovation effort. This effort focused 
on development of energy-efficient and sustainable insulation encapsulated 
in concrete for use in building construction. EBB is a Danish abbreviation for 
environmentally friendly and sustainable construction.
EBB
The companies involved turned 
to ICI for help on how to devel-
op the related business model. 
Hence, ICI was not involved 
in the product development, 
but focused on the develop-
ment of the business model. 
The idea was to develop the 
business model in parallel with 
the final steps of the product 
development. Hence, this case 
description includes aspects of 
the ongoing product develop-
ment process, even though the 
role of ICI was to focus on the 
development of the business 
model, whereas the companies 
involved carried out the prod-
uct development. 
It was part of the value proposition 
that extra insulation could be added 
to buildings without adding extra 
wall thickness. Initially, the concept 
centered on using recycled textiles 
for the insulation. This concept 
served as the starting point for the 
network.
Centering on the upholstery and 
furnishing fabrics company Gabri-
el, EBB’s business model initially 
emphasized the value proposition, 
along with a range of customer seg-
ments. Thus, the overall initial chal-
lenge was to uncover and describe 
the different customer segments and 
how to model the business con-
figuration to target them. This also 
caused uncertainty concerning the 
position within the supply chain.
The initial type of revenue stream 
was, implicitly, a traditional asset 
sale.
Initially, the presumption was that 
the insulation concept would have 
competitive characteristics. There-
fore, the network began working 
with ICI on configuring a suitable 
business model configuration 
among the partners and toward 
customers. The emphasis was on 
the role distribution within the net-
work and how the value proposition 
should be presented.
ICI facilitated a series of meetings 
aimed at uncovering and describing 
each partner’s goals and potential 
engagement in the project. The 
meetings also conveyed the net-
work’s vision, to ensure a high de-
gree of coherence among the part-
ners, by delineating each partner’s 
contribution. This process revealed 
that C.F. Møller no longer wished to 
participate in the network.
Following several workshops fo-
cused on the vision and goal of the 
collaboration, ICI facilitated work-
shops related to business models, 
aiming at providing the network with 
the tools and language needed to 
discuss business model configura-
tions. This also encompassed cre-
ative approaches to construct and 
implement novel business model 
configurations. 
Case presentations
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With the core understanding in 
place, ICI began working with the 
network on defining the customer 
segments. Most of the necessary 
knowledge already resided in the 
network, but was organized and 
formalized in a manner that ena-
bled the network to identify four 
distinct customer segments; two 
were chosen as the primary. These 
were energy renovation and new 
construction. Subsequently, busi-
ness models were constructed for 
the two segments, which led to an 
emphasis on energy renovation as 
the primary customer segment. This 
exercise also led to the identification 
of the total market potential, which 
proved to be very substantial. As 
a supporting step towards benefit-
ting from this potential, ICI gave the 
companies in the network a reward-
ing insight into how modern product 
development processes between 
different companies each with their 
own area of expertise can be organ-
ized and coordinated.
ICI then facilitated contact with the 
Department of Civil Engineering at 
Aalborg University to start a dia-
logue concerning insulation charac-
teristics. A meeting took place, but it 
did not turn into real collaboration.
An already existing insulation 
solution on the market did not have 
the expected insulating effect. The 
hypothesis was that the properties 
could be improved. Instead, Gabriel 
developed an idea that in practice 
proved not to lead to the desired 
result. The study, which was con-
ducted by Gabriel, gave a valuable 
and much deeper insight into the 
challenges involved in developing 
an insulating material, which is 
significantly thinner than the market 
knows of today. The insight led to 
the development of a new and far 
more ambitious product idea, which 
was qualified in collaboration with 
AAU Department of Physics and 
Nanotechnology. A three-year de-
velopment project was established 
and supported by the The Danish 
National Advanced Technology 
Foundation. Besides Gabriel and 
AAU, Hi-con A / S also participates 
in the project.
Based on the market research, 
the potential was significant. This 
prompted Gabriel to start an in-
tensive search for other potential 
technologies, also in relation to 
renovation of insulation in ways 
which would create initially attracted 
results. This spurred ICI to facilitate 
contact with the firm Adapa, in order 
to secure a sufficient number of par-
ticipants in the network, and in order 
to explore whether they could con-
tribute to the process. Adapa spe-
cializes in creating double-curved 
concrete construction, and thus 
is suited for creating unique solu-
tions. However, the involvement of 
Adapa in the network did not lead to 
changes in the concept as such.
ICI facilitated a series 
of meetings aimed at 
uncovering and describing 
each partner’s goals and 
potential engagement in 
the project.
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Although the commercial potential 
of the technology was readily ap-
parent, a business model that would 
make the project attractive to the 
partners was needed. Accordingly, 
ICI mapped each partner’s existing 
business models, to ensure that the 
project either was within their exist-
ing scope or make them aware of 
the requirements for change that the 
project would bring to the partners. 
This also created the background 
for discussing the roles that each 
partner was to play in the future 
configuration and accordingly which 
partner should carry out which parts 
of the development process.
The development process present-
ed important challenges for the 
network, as they needed to con-
struct and coordinate the interfaces 
between the partners and especially 
the different technical fields under 
which they operated. For this, ICI 
presented an architecture approach, 
which enabled the network to 
separate the developments while 
providing a language for communi-
cating the necessary characteristics 
of each component, to assemble the 
different technologies in a finished 
product at a later stage of the devel-
opment process.
In the EBB network, initially the goal 
was to create a network-based busi-
ness model. However, the network 
got wiser over time, and in the end, 
Hi-Con was chosen as the core 
company with the core business 
model.
By the end of 2012, Gabriel was still 
working on developing the insulation 
concept, using inputs from Hi-Con 
and Densit.  The industrial potential 
of the underlying concept seems 
strong. For instance, support has 
been secured from the Advanced 
Technology Foundation (Højteknolo-
gifonden).   
Case presentations
In the EBB network, initially the goal was to create a network-based 
business model. However, the network got wiser over time, and in the end, 
Hi-Con was chosen as the core company with the core business model. 
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Figure 10: The EBB business model
  Key 
 Partners
 - Acquisition of 
particular resources or 
activities
 Key  
 Activities
 - From unknown to 
production
 Value  
 Proposition
 - From unknown to cost 
reduction
 Customer 
  
Relationships
 - From unknown to 
personal assistance
 Customer  
 Segments
 - From segmented to 
mass market 
 Key  
 Resources
 - Intellectual
 Channels
 - From unknown to 
partner stores
  Cost Structure
 - Unknown
 Revenue Structure
 - Asset sale
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The Eye in the Sky network was constructed to create an unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) for use in clearing landmines. A UAV-mounted camera would be 
used to create aerial images of the terrain, which could point toward potential 
landmine areas.
Eye in the Sky
The initial scope of the Eye 
in the Sky (EIS) initiative 
was to create an entirely net-
work-based business to devel-
op, sell, and distribute the UAV 
in the form of a small portable 
helicopter. 
Five companies were initially gath-
ered that all had a natural interest in 
the project because their individual 
contributions were similar to what 
they were doing in their existing 
businesses, and at the same time 
did not compete with their existing 
market. Another motivation was that 
the financial crises had started kick-
ing in, and all of the companies were 
experiencing tougher times due to 
a downturn in the business cycle. It 
therefore added to the interest in the 
project, that the companies expect-
ed to get development activities fully 
funded by ICI. This led to the start 
of the development of a prototype 
of the drone. During this work, it 
became clear that to lift the project 
each partner would have to commit 
to investing capital. The project was 
left in a critical state because the 
partners started losing interest in it.
 
After an extended standstill, an em-
ployee from one of the participating 
companies started raising money 
for the project on his own. As the 
project was in the seed phase, only 
a few funding opportunities were 
available. However, he persuaded 
his father to invest and involved a 
local business incubator as a source 
of syndicated funding. This led to 
the registration of a separate com-
pany, Sky-Watch A/S. The partners 
were still relevant to the project 
of developing a drone helicopter, 
but only one was willing to invest. 
Therefore, the network making up 
the business model changed from 
the pure network model to a situa-
tion in which Sky-Watch would be 
the driving force. 
Under this construction, Sky-Watch 
would act as the mediator and 
distributor, containing no production 
or development facilities. ICI helped 
the network, and in particular the 
newly formed company Sky-Watch, 
to construct the business model, 
starting with a workshop and a se-
ries of regular meetings.
Through this ICI process, it became 
apparent that the proposed con-
struction had many deficiencies, 
which made the initial configuration 
unfeasible, particularly related to the 
control over the supply chain. This 
led the firm to rethink its position 
Case presentations
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and role in the supply chain, and 
reconfigure to become responsible 
for developing the software solution 
completely in-house. Following the 
reconfiguration of the firm, Sky-
Watch entered into a new process 
with ICI, under which the firm’s new 
focus was aligned with the business 
model and the associated business 
plan. ICI facilitated contact with the 
Institute of Electronic Systems at 
Aalborg University, to provide Sky-
Watch with a sparring partner on 
designing and implementing anten-
na technologies.
Concurrent to the change in supply/
production, a process of identify-
ing key customers was initiated in 
collaboration with ICI. Though the 
initial product idea had focused on 
the Nongovernmental Organizations 
(NGO) segment, it was readily ap-
parent that the product would have 
potential uses in other segments. 
During the process, these were 
mapped out and the value proposi-
tion described. This in turn required 
the firm to consider which models 
should be used for targeting differ-
ent segments.
Following the vast changes to the 
original configuration, ICI revisited 
the business model analysis. There-
fore, Sky-Watch and ICI collabo-
rated on mapping out the business 
model and performing a Strength, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities, and 
Threats (SWOT) analysis. This pro-
vided Sky-Watch with a very concise 
presentation of their business, which 
they used thereafter. Furthermore, 
the SWOT analysis pointed out the 
threats and weaknesses faced by 
the firm. This led ICI and Sky-Watch 
to lay out a plan for alleviating these 
issues, as a part of the ongoing 
business development. Additionally, 
ICI and Sky-Watch went through a 
process of comparing the original 
business model with the new revised 
model. This plan was presented 
to Innovation Center Denmark in 
Munich and Shanghai, to assess 
the global potential of the business 
model in different segments.
 
Over the course of the network, it 
became evident that the core prod-
uct essentially had a wide range of 
possibilities, but each application of-
ten required specialized equipment. 
Therefore, ICI presented the network 
with a platform-based model, in 
which the UAV would become an 
integrated hardware and software 
platform on which different add-ons 
could be attached, thus drastically 
increasing the number of potential 
application areas for the product. 
This in turn also meant, as pointed 
out by ICI, that the firm would have 
to focus on finding partners able to 
add value to the concept, by provid-
ing their own unique attachments.
As the platform approach matured, 
ICI made its Senior Advisory Board 
available to Sky-Watch, to pro-
vide experienced feedback on the 
business model used by the firm, 
Concurrent to the change 
in supply/production, a 
process of identifying key 
customers was initiated in 
collaboration with ICI.
Receiving data
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and how to best execute the model. 
This led the firm to further sharp-
en its business model. Although 
some parts, such as propeller and 
batteries, are still sourced from sub 
suppliers the company carries out 
most of its production and assembly 
of products in-house, in order to 
ensure stable delivery. For example, 
the controller software is devel-
oped in-house. At the same time 
Sky-Watch continues to expand the 
distribution network by engaging 
key partners within different market 
segments and geographies. 
Case presentations
As the platform approach matured, ICI made its Senior Advisory Board 
available to Sky-Watch, to provide experienced feedback on the business 
model used by the firm, and how to best execute the model. This led the 
firm to further sharpen its business model. 
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Figure 11: The Eye in the sky business model
Figure 12: Illustration of trade promotion
  Key 
 Partners
 - Acquisition of 
particular resources or 
activities
 Key  
 Activities
 - From platform/ 
network to problem 
solving
 Value  
 Proposition
 - From unknown to cost 
reduction
 Customer 
  
Relationships
 - Personal assistance
 Customer  
 Segments
 - From niche to 
segmented
 Key  
 Resources
 - From intellectual to 
human
 Channels
 - From sales force to 
partner stores
  Cost Structure
 - Fixed costs
 Revenue Structure
 - Asset sale
Network timeframe 2012 totals 2013-2015 expectations
Revenue:  
0
Revenue:  
0
Projected revenue: 
15 -> 30
Result:  
-1,306 tDKK
Result: 
-
Projected results: 
-
FTE: 
-
Number of employees: 
**
Projected employees: 
-
Investments: 
-
“Your window space and power in exchange 
for a quantity of free advertising on the system 
in your local area.”
“Your window space and power in exchange 
for a quantity of free advertising on the system 
in your local area.”
Cspot attracted more than 
100 sites based on this model.
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COWI initiated the project. The company wanted to acquire data on pedestrian 
and vehicle traffic. This data was to be generated by tracking cellphone 
movements, which could be done anonymously. The data was to be incorporated 
into COWI’s existing business, to generate higher demand for engineering 
consultancy in relation to traffic and urban planning.
Mobile Tracking
In this perspective, COWI 
sought only to buy the data, to 
process it and create a profit. 
Accordingly, the aim was to 
build business models for the 
presumed data suppliers, while 
extending COWI’s existing 
business model. The main idea 
was to sell the data as part of 
the company’s engineering ser-
vices through asset sales.  
From COWI’s perspective, the pro-
ject contained two distinct challeng-
es that became the ICI focus. On 
the one hand, it was necessary to 
procure the data. However, COWI 
had to build an understanding of 
how the data could be used by 
potential customers and in what 
form. This related to how customers 
could use the data directly and how 
the data collected could be used by 
COWI to provide improved engineer-
ing services.
Initially, COWI had expected to 
be able to use data directly from 
telephone service providers. The 
providers, however, proved reluc-
tant to enter into such a project. 
This was primarily due to legislation 
issues and huge data quantities. 
Telephone data can be tracked back 
to a person, which requires written 
permission from the user and in-
creases data security requirements. 
Accordingly, ICI and COWI turned 
their attention to BLIP Systems 
(BLIP), to uncover whether BLIP’s 
technology could be applied. ICI 
facilitated meetings and workshops 
where it became apparent to BLIP 
that it could open up a new business 
area by adapting the existing indoor 
technology for outdoor usage, which 
provided a means of obtaining the 
necessary data. Accordingly, BLIP 
and COWI agreed to set up testing 
systems in collaboration, to gauge 
the system’s effectiveness and pre-
cision. These tests were sufficiently 
successful to continue the collabo-
ration.
ICI also facilitated contact with the 
IT department at Aalborg University, 
to provide the network with tech-
nical feedback on the system and 
its effectiveness. This provided the 
network with the knowledge that the 
share of cellphones with Bluetooth 
activated was actually declining. 
This raised some concerns, but 
Case presentations
Despite a functioning 
business model, ICI 
reckoned this only 
scraped the surface of the 
concept’s capabilities and 
actual value. 
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BLIP pointed out that the system 
could also track Wi-Fi if necessary, 
which would further increase system 
efficiency.
On the customer side, COWI and ICI 
contacted a host of potential actors 
that might be interested in the pro-
cured data. Through several meet-
ings with the network, it became 
apparent that there was indeed po-
tential in harnessing the data, which 
helped further motivate COWI. Thus, 
the value creation capability of the 
concept was clarified.
The system’s tracking capabilities 
raised some concerns about its 
legality. To ensure the legal aspects 
were covered, ICI had the legal de-
partment at Aalborg University draw 
up a juridical note that explained 
why the tracking was completely 
anonymous and therefore legal.
From the outset, COWI had entered 
the project with the aim of buying 
data from a supplier and using the 
data according to customer needs. 
However, BLIP was not used to 
delivering data, since the firm was 
a hardware and services company. 
Additionally, no single party on the 
customer side had the necessary 
means or goal to buy and deploy 
such a system. This lack of invest-
ment capability, or will, became 
highly apparent through a series of 
ICI-facilitated business model work-
shops, which showed that neither 
BLIP nor COWI was prepared to 
make the necessary investments. 
This created significant conflicts be-
tween the two parties, which almost 
terminated the collaboration. For 
instance, BLIP was initially unwilling 
to sign an exclusive contract in the 
Nordic countries with COWI. In an-
other context, such a setup had cost 
the firm millions of DKK. However, 
BLIP changed its position concern-
ing this point later in the project.
  
A partial solution was negotiated 
when the concept was introduced 
to the traffic department at COWI. 
The customers the company worked 
with had the funds and could see 
a large enough return rate to invest 
in the system. This meant that BLIP 
had to adopt COWI’s type of reve-
nue stream, from receiving payment 
at installation to a more leasing-in-
spired type of revenue stream, under 
which the equipment cost was 
covered over a longer period. This 
was done to accommodate COWI’s 
aversion to investments. Despite 
a functioning business model, ICI 
reckoned this only scraped the 
surface of the concept’s capabilities 
and actual value.
Primarily, ICI argued that the value 
is mainly derived from the data, yet 
in reality, the COWI/BLIP alliance 
sells hardware that then delivers 
the data. For COWI especially, this 
meant that the service was being 
sold at cost plus, rather than focus-
ing on the value creation potential. 
Furthermore, selling the hardware 
had proved infeasible for tracking 
pedestrians, and selling the system 
for tracking traffic was an ongoing 
challenge. Selling the data would 
create a much tighter coupling with 
the value received by customers, by 
making the value proposition more 
readily apparent to customers.
Focusing on COWI, the challenge 
was to elucidate the value creation 
id
id
Patterns of movement
tagetgroup
Unique Wireless ID
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potential of the data. This was done 
through a series of meetings and 
workshops, and ICI even facilitated 
a workshop exclusively for potential 
data customers, to gauge the value 
potential to present to COWI. This 
also spawned a host of student pro-
jects, dealing with uncovering the 
value potential for different custom-
ers. The ICI Senior Advisory Board 
also supported the process, in trying 
to explain the potential inherent in 
the data, and trying to persuade 
COWI to change its business model. 
The purpose was to persuade COWI 
to adapt a more investment-based 
approach, with presumably higher 
revenues in the longer run. COWI 
also attended a range of ICI-ar-
ranged seminars in Silicon Valley, 
which also sought to provide the 
company with a better understand-
ing of the inherent potential in an 
international perspective.
However, COWI was reluctant to 
work with types of revenue streams 
that do not guarantee investment up 
front. As a result, the firm chose to 
continue focusing on tracking traffic. 
The product remains available for 
pedestrian tracking, if a suitable 
investor emerges, but is not being 
actively pursued.
BLIP has successfully copied the 
business model outside the Nor-
dic countries (for example, in New 
Zealand).
For COWI, it seems that the huge 
international potential is not being 
reaped, perhaps due to the lack of 
ability to support intrapreneurship, 
i.e., developing new business areas 
within the organization. 
The expected key figures for Mobile 
Tracking are quite difficult to assess. 
Specifically, the results cannot be 
related only to the COWI City Sense 
project, but depend also on the 
amount of derived revenue gener-
ated through sales of engineering 
services. This also makes it difficult 
to assess the number of employ-
ees, as the concept will arguably 
also generate a substantial amount 
of derived activities, in the form of 
engineering services. Therefore, the 
expected results and employees are 
conservative guesses, which may 
indeed be significantly larger.
Case presentations
The expected key figures for Mobile Tracking are quite difficult to assess. 
Specifically, the results cannot be related only to the COWI City Sense 
project, but depend also on the amount of derived revenue generated 
through sales of engineering services.
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Figure 13: The mobile tracking business model
Figure 14: Illustration of trade promotion
Network timeframe 2012 totals 2013-2015 expectations
Revenue:  
1,500 tDKK
Revenue:  
1,400 tDKK
Projected revenue:  
5,000 -> 25,000 tDKK
Result:  
100 tDKK
Result:  
100 tDKK
Projected results:  
500 -> 2,500 tDKK
FTE:  
3
Employees:  
3
Projected employees:  
4 > 8
Investments:  
500 tDKK
  Key 
 Partners
 - Acquisition of 
particular resources or 
activities
 Key  
 Activities
 - Problem solving
 Value  
 Proposition
 - Cost reduction
 Customer 
  
Relationships
 - Personal assistance
 Customer  
 Segments
 - Niche
 Key  
 Resources
 - Human
 Channels
 - Sales force
  Cost Structure
 - From variable costs to economies of scale
 Revenue Structure
 - From asset sale to subscription fees
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When the Provital ICI network was first set up, Provital Solution (Provital) was 
essentially a company trying to create novel applications for the LiqTech (formerly 
known as CoMeTas) membrane technology, using in-house knowledge and 
expertise on plumbing and water treatment at the investor firm Kaj Larsen VVS. 
At that point, the firm had a whole range of potential applications, which were all 
being pursued to some degree. Common was an emphasis on traditional asset 
sale types of revenue streams.
Provital Solution
The initial ICI efforts focused 
on describing Provital’s cur-
rent business model. However, 
it became readily apparent 
that the firm had no focused 
model, as Provital was pursu-
ing many different application 
possibilities. The only common 
denominator was the LiqTech 
membrane technology. There-
fore, ICI helped Provital in 
their choice to select the Spa 
and Pool market, based on the 
company’s existing capabilities, 
market access, and knowledge. 
Provital focused its business, as 
needed. 
Subsequently, ICI conducted a risk 
analysis of the chosen segment, 
clarifying the risks and uncertainties 
that had to be addressed as part of 
the business development (the risk 
management aspects of business 
modeling is further elaborated in the 
ICI publication Taran et al. (2010), 
which also use Provital as empirical 
background). This elucidated the 
challenges Provital faced and pro-
vided the company with a road map 
for dealing with these challenges in 
a structured manner.
However, Provital did not follow the 
recommendations very well. One 
reason was financial problems faced 
by the firm and its investors. This led 
the firm to pursue several smaller 
projects, which essentially acted as 
a drain on the firm’s resources, as 
they provided no steady revenue 
streams. Therefore, an investment 
from NOVI Invest was secured. 
Novi Invest is situated in relation 
to Aalborg University. Provital was 
provided some financial stability 
needed to develop the firm and its 
business model. However, as shown 
in the following, the investment was 
not significant enough for Provital 
to purposefully implement a new 
business model. In this respect, the 
company still had to focus much of 
its attention on generating short-
term revenue, which should be seen 
as the backdrop for much of the 
following development descriptions. 
This lack of investment was also 
pointed out as a problem by ICI, and 
actions were taken to secure better 
investors.
At this stage, it was evident that 
Provital faced significant difficulties 
selling its product. Consequently, 
ICI collaborated with Provital on 
analyzing the market and the sales 
channels traditionally used. Although 
Provital had previously focused on 
selling directly to waterparks, ICI 
prompted the firm to turn its focus 
to targeting equipment installers, 
as these were deemed the most 
influential actors. Subsequently, 
ICI helped create various types of 
marketing material and a Customer 
Relationship Management (CRM) 
system. However, Provital still 
struggled with sales, despite a more 
aggressive approach to the sales 
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process. Therefore, ICI made a thor-
ough case analysis: Sell to the the 
Gigantium indoor swimming pool. 
This provided the firm with valuable 
insights into the dynamics of deci-
sion processes in the market, and 
proved that the sales situation was 
highly complex with multiple actors 
influencing the choice of filtration 
system. These included engineers, 
installers, contractors, the project 
board, and the municipality funding 
the construction. ICI also supported 
tests conducted in Gladsaxe. 
These initiatives helped Provital 
acquire key insights concerning the 
dynamics of the Danish procurement 
processes of state-owned institu-
tions. These were the main cus-
tomers in Denmark for the filtration 
system category in which Provital 
operates. The key takeaway was 
that even though the Provital solu-
tion would achieve cost parity over a 
relatively short period, the procure-
ment legislation was not designed to 
consider this. The industry did not 
understand that Provital’s solution 
would actually save the swimming 
pools money in the end. Conse-
quently, Provital’s solution was often 
rejected due to the higher initial 
investment. In conclusion, the sales 
challenges consisted of a higher 
initial investment, combined with 
having to persuade a wide range 
of decision makers to purchase the 
then relatively unknown Provital 
solution.
To elucidate these challenges, ICI 
also worked with Provital to better 
describe their value proposition 
relative to competing solutions. 
This armed Provital with compelling 
arguments for its system’s supe-
riority, but also provided insights 
into the areas where the Provital 
solution could be considered inferior 
to those of competitors. This also 
provided Provital with a road map of 
the factors the company needed to 
improve to become more competi-
tive. With the initial investment price 
being a major hindrance to adop-
tion, a leasing model was suggest-
ed, but it was later abandoned, due 
to the legislation in the area.
In parallel with these developments, 
ICI also urged Provital to consider 
a more international strategy, to 
access markets of larger scope and 
potential with different structures. 
The notion was that other markets 
could have more feasible character-
istics, which made the markets eas-
ier to penetrate. Therefore, Provital 
attempted to open the German and 
Swedish markets, though with little 
success. Additionally, ICI facilitated 
contact with a Silicon Valley com-
pany working with clean-tech, but 
collaboration never emerged.
ICI pushed for a more partnership 
oriented approach. The break-
through for Provital came in the form 
of a partnership with one of Nor-
way’s largest pool installers, which 
began selling and installing the 
Provital filtration solution. Provital 
These initiatives helped 
Provital acquire key 
insights concerning the 
dynamics of the Danish 
procurement processes of 
state-owned institutions.
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came to rely on this configuration. 
Thus, instead of directly seeking out 
customers, the company relied on 
building partnerships with install-
ers, thus minimizing the sales effort 
required on Provital’s part. The Nor-
wegian market and partner provided 
significant growth. Additional con-
tacts were established in Australia, 
which, by the end of 2012, seemed 
to be heading toward partnerships. 
Furthermore, Provital began working 
on entering the US market. Antici-
pating this expansion, Provital was 
also planning to in-source their 
production, by relocating to new 
premises in Hobro.
These significant developments 
were largely enabled by the arrival 
of a new investor, who bought the 
majority of the firm and assumed the 
role of CEO. This provided the nec-
essary financial backing to develop 
the firm and make long-term in-
vestments in building relations with 
international partners.
Last, throughout the development, 
the original investor had supplied 
manufacturing services in assem-
bling the filtration units. Decoupled 
from the investor financially, Provital 
negotiated significantly better prices 
for manufacturing. Additionally, the 
increased volume also provided Pro-
vital with significant leverage over 
other suppliers, which enabled the 
company to cut costs significantly.
By the end of 2012, Provital had 
become a profitable business, with 
a very positive outlook on the future, 
expecting high growth, mainly from 
growing existing, and new, interna-
tional markets.
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These significant developments were largely enabled by the arrival of a 
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Figure 15: The Provital Solution business model
Figure 16: Illustration of trade promotion
Network timeframe 2012 totals 2013-2015 expectations
Revenue: 
2,400 tDKK
Revenue: 
12,000 tDKK
Projected revenue: 
60,000 ->130,000 tDKK
Result: 
-3,000 tDKK
Result: 
3,000 tDKK
Projected results: 
15,000 -> 35.000 tDKK
FTE: 
4.7
Employees: 
2.5
Projected employees: 
6 -> 14
Investments: 
3,000 tDKK
  Key 
 Partners
 - Acquisition of 
particular resources or 
activities
 Key  
 Activities
 - Production
 Value  
 Proposition
 - From unknown to cost 
reduction
 Customer 
  
Relationships
 - Personal assistance
 Customer  
 Segments
 - From unknown to 
niche
 Key  
 Resources
 - From human to 
intellectual
 Channels
 - From sales force to 
partner stores
  Cost Structure
 - From unknown to variable costs
 Revenue Structure
 - Asset sale
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The central idea of the SAFE network was to increase the use of trains for 
transporting goods nationally by inventing a novel “Container Transfer System” 
(CTS). This would enable a quick transfer of containers from train carts onto trucks 
and vice versa. The invention was to be coupled with a complete reconfiguration 
of the goods transportation processes. 
SAFE
When the SAFE project began 
working with ICI, many of the 
central concepts and system 
processes had already been 
developed by the system’s 
inventor namely the owner of 
SAFE Green Logistics (SAFE) - 
the core firm in the network. At 
that time, the development of 
the CTS, as well as an IT system 
to handle the reconfigured pro-
cesses, was already under way.    
The initial partnership process 
focused on engaging component 
suppliers as partners, rather than 
finding partners relevant for oper-
ations. However, the presumption 
was that operations-focused part-
ners would become available once 
the concept matured. Consequently, 
at the outset of the network, SAFE 
Green Logistics mainly emphasized 
the network-level business model 
and the value proposition toward 
end customers from the finished 
operational concept. In that re-
spect, the firm had not decided 
how its own business model was to 
be structured, or the relations with 
operations partners. Accordingly, the 
following representation (Figure 18) 
is the best estimate of how the core 
firm’s business was presumed. This 
presumption was built on a common 
type of revenue stream of receiving 
usage fees for each item handled 
through the system.
The initial challenge was to ensure 
that the network construction con-
tained all the necessary competenc-
es and knowledge areas needed to 
specify and implement the system 
as envisioned. ICI facilitated contact 
with Lyngsoe Systems, which could 
provide the necessary knowledge 
on large-scale logistic and package 
handling systems and significantly 
increase the legitimacy of the con-
cept.
Initially, the SAFE inventor had glob-
al ambitions, seeking to roll out the 
system in Europe within a relatively 
short time span. ICI was quick to 
point out that the scope and scale of 
such a system would make such an 
aggressive rollout unfeasible. Thus, 
ICI ensured that the network limited 
its initial scope to Denmark, to pro-
vide a proof-of-concept.
As the nature of the project was one 
of development, initially clarifying 
which parts of the development 
should be handled by which part-
ners was important, a process ICI 
facilitated in collaboration with the 
network partners.
Early in the process, the core firm 
emphasized the potential CO2 emis-
sion savings made possible by the 
system. However, as these savings 
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were unconfirmed, ICI ensured 
collaboration with the Department of 
Development and Planning at Aal-
borg University. This collaboration 
provided the network with educated 
estimates and well-founded argu-
ments for the system’s green profile.
Due to the way the network was 
constructed, SAFE essentially 
funded the majority of the develop-
ment, which put a large strain on the 
company’s finances. Thus, ICI aided 
SAFE in applying for extra devel-
opment funds, though no funding 
was approved. This was due to the 
sheer scale of the concept, which 
demanded massive financial back-
ing as well as dedicated partners, in 
particular for operations purposes. 
In that respect, although the firm 
was quite confident in the system’s 
physical possibility and practicali-
ty, the business model layer of the 
concept had to be addressed, a 
process ICI initiated and facilitated. 
This process also encompassed 
gauging the potential engagement of 
the different partners, and ensuring 
that SAFE knew how it was going to 
construct its own business once the 
system was operational. This pro-
cess also sought to create the foun-
dation for a business plan for how 
the system should be rolled out.
At this point, most of the network 
partners had little involvement, as 
they all received direct payment 
from SAFE for their contributions. 
Furthermore, constructing the 
business model and building rela-
tionships with operations partners 
turned out to be difficult. Central to 
these difficulties was that SAFE’s 
presumed network construc-
tion hinged on engaging existing 
truck-driving operators to carry most 
of the risk associated with the con-
cept. Although ICI tried to influence 
SAFE in building other approaches, 
the questions made by ICI remained 
largely unanswered throughout most 
of the project. 
SAFE considered several types of 
revenue streams for the business 
along with ICI. However, the com-
pany was never able to anchor a 
specific type of revenue stream, 
due to the lack of clarity on how 
the network or supply chain, or 
more precisely the “service chain,” 
should be configured. This meant 
that SAFE lacked clarity on where in 
the system the business would fit in, 
and how the company could secure 
and maintain that position. Rather 
than attempting to collaborate with 
potential competitors, SAFE should 
have included the customer more 
in the development process, rather 
than continuing to develop the CTS, 
software, etc., that may have need-
ed to be changed later anyway.
Following an extended standstill, 
a new project manager was em-
ployed, who provided the network 
... the firm was quite 
confident in the system’s 
physical possibility and 
practicality, the business 
model layer of the concept 
had to be addressed, a 
process ICI initiated and 
facilitated.
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with renewed energy. Subsequently, 
ICI facilitated a learning trip to Sili-
con Valley in California, to provide a 
more international perspective and 
uncover the challenges potentially 
faced in different markets, empha-
sizing the US.
At the end of the ICI project, the 
new project manager had drawn 
up a new plan for the rollout of the 
concept. The first order of business 
is to finish the CTS prototype, to 
prove that the central technology 
was operational. Then, to prove 
that the technology can function in 
a system, a small-scale test project 
will be initiated. The test project will 
focus on transporting containers 
and pallets between Aalborg and 
Copenhagen exclusively. All pallet 
sorting will be done in Aalborg. The 
purpose of the test project is to 
prove the savings made possible 
and thus attract freight operators 
and public attention. At the outset, 
SAFE will interact directly with cus-
tomers, and purchase truck services 
from local operators. SAFE expects 
to establish the test project at the 
end of 2014. The current estimates 
for the test project alone project 
possible savings of up toward 20% 
per transported item. 
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Following an extended standstill, a new project manager was employed, 
who provided the network with renewed energy. Subsequently, ICI 
facilitated a learning trip to Silicon Valley in California, to provide a more 
international perspective and uncover the challenges potentially faced in 
different markets, emphasizing the US. 
IC
I 
P
ro
je
ct
 R
ep
or
t 
B
us
in
es
s 
M
od
el
s 
in
 N
et
w
or
ks
/61
SAFE has not yet had any profit revenue, and since the investments are still expected by the network to provide 
return, they have not been written off.
*) The parentheses indicate the projected number of independent truck drivers to handle the first and last parts of 
the transportation.
Figure 17: The SAFE business model
Figure 18: Illustration of trade promotion
Network timeframe 2012 totals 2013-2015 expectations
Revenue:  
0
Revenue:  
0
Projected revenue:  
0 -> 80,000 tDKK
Result:  
0
Result:  
0
Projected results:  
0 -> 15,000 tDKK
FTE:  
8
Employees:  
5
Projected employees:  
5 -> 10 (+20) *
Investments:  
24,000 tDKK
  Key 
 Partners
 - Acquisition of 
particular resources or 
activities
 Key  
 Activities
 - From problem solving 
to platform/network
 Value  
 Proposition
 - Cost reduction
 Customer 
  
Relationships
 - Automated services
 Customer  
 Segments
 - Mass market
 Key  
 Resources
 - Intellectual
 Channels
 - Sales force
  Cost Structure
 - From fixed costs to economies of scale
 Revenue Structure
 - Usage fee
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The purpose of the Seafood network was to build new business models, based 
on the existing business, while also strengthening the latter. The existing business 
bought fish at the local auction in Hanstholm and resold them to various outlets, 
such as restaurants, catering companies, and canteens. The model was built on 
conventional asset sales. 
Seafood
Accordingly, ICI started out 
by mapping and analyzing the 
firm’s existing business model, 
to identify the business’s weak-
nesses. 
These weaknesses mainly related 
to the sales part of the organization, 
as customers were mainly loyal to 
specific sales individuals. Thus, the 
existing business model depended 
on retaining these sales individuals. 
The mapping emphasized the need 
for a better, more robust business 
model, and provided the firm with 
the tools and language necessary to 
express their business model ideas.
From the start, the firm’s goal was to 
build new business models for sell-
ing and distributing fish, to private 
customers. This defined the scope 
of the project and provided it with 
some direction. As a starting point, 
ICI procured a market analysis of the 
Danish fish market made, to provide 
an idea of the opportunities in the 
market. This led to an increased un-
derstanding of the market in which 
Copenhagen Seafood, the core firm 
in the network, wanted to operate, 
and provided validation for targeting 
the private market. This also provid-
ed the project with the theme, the 
sale and distribution of perishable 
foods. 
One of the early ideas was to focus 
on the firm’s existing strength, 
minced fish, which led to the idea of 
setting up minced fish vending ma-
chines in stores. This idea prompted 
Copenhagen Seafood to purchase a 
minced fish machine without much 
further consideration. However, the 
entire concept was scrapped due 
to food safety regulations, which 
prompted Copenhagen Seafood to 
sell the machine at a significant loss. 
Two student workers were attached 
to the project on behalf of ICI, as 
part of the development process. 
One focused on the potential 
globalization aspects of the firm’s 
business model, emphasizing SWOT 
analysis of the firm, which led to a 
series of recommendations, namely, 
to pursue the consumer market, as 
it contained the biggest potential. 
The other student worker focused 
on building the firm’s branding and 
communication, to strengthen the 
firm’s customer relations with exist-
ing customers. 
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The communication parts was part 
of the broader initiative related to 
strengthening the firm’s existing 
business model. This focused on es-
tablishing lasting relations with cus-
tomers through their own brand, by 
emphasizing Copenhagen Seafood’s 
focus on quality products. This also 
entailed entering into closer col-
laborations with buyers, to ensure 
that they would buy the seasonal 
fish and adapt their own assortment 
accordingly. Although not a new 
business model, understanding and 
strengthening the existing model 
was also a key part of the network, 
which led to large growth for the 
firm.
Subsequently, ICI analyzed Copen-
hagen Seafood’s existing business 
processes and routines. This led to 
the realization that the sales pro-
cess in particular was highly ineffi-
cient, as it was all handled over the 
telephone. This spawned the idea 
of creating a web-based solution 
where customers could place their 
orders. Accordingly, through a series 
of workshops, ICI aided the firm 
in understanding how digital tools 
and platforms could be used and 
operated, and the possibilities they 
provided.
Consecutive ICI meetings and work-
shops further defined the concept, 
to emphasize that building new 
business models should provide the 
firm with synergy effects within the 
existing business areas. This was to 
be done by leveraging parts of the 
existing business while ensuring that 
any new business models would not 
dilute the existing business. 
To aid the firm in its endeavors, ICI 
invited the network to a workshop 
trip to San Francisco, to provide 
new inputs in how a business model 
could be constructed. This trip 
focused on typical business models 
within the food industry. Further-
more, the workshops emphasized 
the challenges faced by growth 
companies.
The digital platform was meant to 
be a universal tool for driving the 
business further, which spawned a 
range of potential ideas that could 
use the system. Together with ICI, 
the firm analyzed the ideas, their 
potential for implementation, and 
their impact on the firm, particularly 
in terms of the amount of resources 
needed. Eventually, this led the firm 
to focus on a model under which 
the sale would go through personnel 
associations at larger firms. For im-
plementing the concept, ICI also ad-
vised on potential subsidy arrange-
ments for employees, and assisted 
Copenhagen Seafood in finding a 
suitable candidate for the job.
Consecutive ICI meetings 
and workshops further 
defined the concept, to 
emphasize that building 
new business models 
should provide the firm 
with synergy effects within 
the existing business 
areas.
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Seeing international potential, ICI fa-
cilitated contact with Potsdam Uni-
versity, to have groups of students 
provide some of the international 
perspectives on the viability of the 
business model in foreign markets. 
This not only helped verify the busi-
ness model but also provided the 
firm with insights into the German 
consumer market for fresh fish.
In the summer of 2012, Copenhagen 
Seafood launched its new business 
model for live testing in Copenha-
gen, Denmark. Copenhagen was 
chosen as it was the largest domes-
tic market. Additionally, Copenha-
gen Seafood is already established 
in the city, serving restaurants and 
catering companies. The test was a 
success, which hinted at the poten-
tial, exceeding what was originally 
anticipated.
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implementation, and their impact on the firm, particularly in terms of the 
amount of resources needed.
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Figure 19: The seafood business model
Figure 20: Illustration of trade promotion
Network timeframe 2012 totals 2013-2015 expectations
Revenue:  
24,000 tDKK
Revenue:  
10,000 tDKK
Projected revenue:  
13,000 -> 19,000 tDKK
Result:  
140 tDKK
Result:  
310 tDKK
Projected results:  
700 -> 1,350 tDKK
FTE:  
6
Employees:  
6
Projected employees:  
8 -> 9
Investments:  
1,500 DKK
  Key 
 Partners
 - Acquisition of 
particular resources 
or activities to 
optimization and 
economies of scale
 Key  
 Activities
 - Production
 Value  
 Proposition
 - From quality to price
 Customer 
  
Relationships
 - From personal 
assistance to self-
service
 Customer  
 Segments
 - From niche to mass 
market
 Key  
 Resources
 - Human
 Channels
 - From sales force to 
web-sales
  Cost Structure
 - Economies of scope
 Revenue Structure
 - Asset sale
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The Space Creator network was based on the idea of creating a platform for 
product ideation, development, and prototyping, heavily using inputs from lead 
users, through a platform connecting lead users and inventors with potential 
manufacturers.
Space Creator
The concept focused on highly 
integrated space-saving solu-
tions. Subsequently, this should 
enable other partners to build 
their own business models on 
top of the platform approach. 
The goal from the start was for 
Space Creator to be a collab-
oration platform, driven by 
network partners. Thus, the 
concept did not have its own 
business model. 
Initially, uncovering and describing 
the relevance of the overall Space 
Creator concept, to provide justifica-
tion for the project, was important. 
This was done through a student 
project on behalf of ICI, in which 
the Danish furniture market was 
scanned for similar products and 
concepts. The result was an over-
view of potential domestic compet-
itors with similar characteristics as 
Space Creator, in the form of inte-
grated space-saving solutions. This 
proved that very few established 
players emphasized space saving 
in an integrated manner, and even 
fewer worked with actual solutions, 
but rather emphasized single pieces 
of furniture. The student project also 
described the current megatrend 
within the field of space-saving 
accommodation. This aided the net-
work in understanding and commu-
nicating the relevancy of the Space 
Creator concept, and helped them 
further refine the basic ideas and 
concepts.
One of the central issues for the 
network was deciding what kind of 
sales and distribution method to 
use. Therefore, ICI facilitated a range 
of workshops that outlined different 
possible scenarios and models for 
the sales and distribution process. 
Consequently, the network decided 
on a low-cost model, emphasizing 
web sales initially and making the 
web sale construction as light as 
possible, by having other partners 
handle the logistics, thus avoiding 
inventory costs. This development 
should be seen in relation to the 
central concept of involving lead us-
ers and inventors. The web shop ap-
proach was meant as a method for 
engaging and creating interest, by 
providing lead users and inventors 
with relevant products. The website 
would thus serve two functions, in 
acting as the sales channel for the 
products and the platform for involv-
ing users to generate ideas. There-
fore, the network would maintain 
an open approach to the sales and 
distribution method as the concept 
matured and gained more products 
with a wider scope. ICI’s role in the 
process was to provide analytical 
insight into the consequences of 
choosing different methods of sales 
and distribution.
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ICI also hosted workshops focused 
on the value proposition and the 
customer segments targeted by the 
concept. Although the space-saving 
concept had market potential, the 
network had to be able to demon-
strate this potential in actual prod-
ucts or prototypes. This also fos-
tered important consideration within 
the network of the characteristics of 
the products regarding whether they 
should be considered furniture or 
integrated component solutions of 
the residence, similar to kitchens.
This issue emphasizes another key 
issue faced by the network, which 
relates to the dilemma faced by 
the network. On the one hand, the 
network needed products to create 
customer/user interest, and on the 
other hand, the network needed 
lead users to create product ide-
as that would in turn become the 
products. ICI attempted to over-
come this dilemma in two ways. The 
first was to initiate a student project 
that described potential new prod-
ucts. The second was to facilitate 
a whole range of business model 
workshops. The point with these in-
itiatives was to make an investment 
in creating new products that could 
attract customers and users, who 
could generate the prerequisite ide-
as. Thus, the presumption was that 
the system could be made self-sus-
taining once enough products were 
on the platform.
Although the workshops spawned a 
range of ideas, very few was actu-
ally prototyped, let alone manufac-
tured. To understand this better ICI  
interviewed the network partners 
individually. The biggest challenge 
was to reach a prototype level which 
is more or less ready for mass pro-
duction. 
Although the workshops spawned a 
range of ideas, very few was actually 
prototyped. ICI later figured out why, 
after all the network partners were 
interviewed individually. Most of the 
partners were essentially fabricators, 
building products to order, through 
rigidly defined systems. Therefore, 
the partners would receive specific 
orders from their customers, rather 
than create and maintain their own 
line of products. Consequently, the 
partners’ business models were 
not compatible with the focus on 
product development dictated by 
the Space Creator concept.
Most of the partners were essential-
ly fabricators, building products to 
order, through rigidly defined sys-
tems. Therefore, the partners would 
receive specific orders from their 
customers, rather than create and 
maintain their own line of products. 
Consequently, the partners’ busi-
ness models were not compatible 
with the focus on product develop-
ment dictated by the Space Creator 
concept. Eventually, ICI pointed out 
to Space Creator that the company 
needed to be more specific about 
ICI’s role in the process 
was to provide 
analytical insight into the 
consequences of choosing 
different methods of sales 
and distribution. 
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the Space Creator value proposi-
tion to its partners. Therefore, ICI 
recommended the company forego 
the purely network-driven approach 
and instead focus on making Space 
Creator an independent business, 
which could engage partners on its 
own terms, instead of having central 
decisions made by its partners. 
Eventually, this led to the forming of 
Space Creator as an independent 
business, with staff exclusively hired 
to promote and expand the Space 
Creator concept. Accordingly, 
Space Creator was primarily estab-
lished as a web shop solution, which 
would find products and solutions 
from suppliers that have existing 
products that fit the Space Creator 
theme.
Subsequently, Dolle, the main 
sponsor of the project, forged ahead 
and is working on finishing its ceil-
ing-drawer and bringing it to mar-
ket. Additionally, the company has 
established contact with a French 
partner, with which Space Creator 
began creating pre-manufactured 
porches. This concept is related, as 
it also deals with pre-manufacturing 
adaptable solutions, yet focuses on 
the outdoors, where there are fewer 
constrictions to consider. 
Case presentations
Although the workshops spawned a range of ideas, very few was actually 
prototyped. ICI later figured out why, after all the network partners were 
interviewed individually.
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Figure 21: The space creator business model
  Key 
 Partners
 - Acquisition of 
particular resources or 
activities
 Key  
 Activities
 - Platform/network
 Value  
 Proposition
 - Customization
 Customer 
  
Relationships
 - Co-creation
 Customer  
 Segments
 - From niche to multi-
sided
 Key  
 Resources
 - From intellectual to 
human
 Channels
 - From unknown to 
web-sales
  Cost Structure
 - From unknown to economies of scope
 Revenue Structure
 - From unknown to brokerage fees
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The ViewWorld network set out to develop a flexible multipurpose reporting tool, 
aimed primarily at NGOs. This tool could be in the form of questionnaires, picture 
documentation, or interviews, thus reducing the amount of double-work by doing 
the reporting digitally from the start. 
ViewWorld
Initially, the firm focused on 
keeping the organization as 
small as possible by using soft-
ware partners for the actual 
software development. In turn, 
ViewWorld would interpret 
customer feedback, needs, and 
wants, and translate them into 
software specifications. The 
basic idea of the business was 
to develop a turnkey solution 
for NGOs.
Some of the funding was to be 
secured by initially selling special-
ized solutions to NGOs below the 
incurred development cost. The 
idea was that the code from the 
specialized solutions could be used 
in the turnkey solution. Additionally, 
the specialized solutions would also 
provide knowledge on the types of 
data gathering needed.
As depicted in Figure 23, ViewWorld 
based its business model on an 
asset sale type of revenue stream, 
under which the company would 
receive one-time payments for the 
right to use the software.
Initially, ICI set out to challenge the 
proposed business model, direct-
ing attention to key considerations 
that needed to be addressed. For 
instance, why focus on NGOs when 
other customer segments would 
be more interested, as NGOs are 
traditionally highly constricted in 
their procurement policies. ICI also 
pointed out that the NGO segment 
was quickly becoming crowded 
by non-profit organizations, while 
ViewWorld strived to make a profit. 
ICI helped ViewWorld broaden its 
perspective, which eventually turned 
the firm’s focus to the potential in-
herent in other customer segments. 
ICI also helped the firm identify new 
potential customers and methods 
for approaching them. However, 
more time spent on selecting cus-
tomer segments would have been a 
good idea. 
ICI also clarified the need to develop 
a better defined sales and market-
ing organization, in contrast to the 
mainly personal/network-driven 
approach applied by the ViewWorld 
owners. This task proved arduous, 
as ViewWorld was highly focused on 
just building the software, because 
of the company’s commitment to 
existing customers. ICI also ques-
tioned whether the software-devel-
oper approach was indeed feasible, 
in financial terms and in terms of 
development speed and flexibility, 
which had proven troublesome. 
Therefore, ViewWorld later chose 
to internalize the software devel-
opment, to achieve a more flexible 
development process fully focused 
on the one project.
Case presentations
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Even with the software development 
in-sourced, ViewWorld still struggled 
to deliver a market-ready solution, 
as an increasing number of features 
were added to the specification re-
quirements, indicative of the lack of 
focus in the organization. However, 
by February 2012, a new CEO was 
hired, which coincided with a more 
operations-driven approach from 
ICI, emphasizing what needed to be 
done in development, administra-
tion, and sales and marketing. This 
radically changed the firm’s pace 
and orientation, leading to better 
planning and segmentation of the 
customer segments. The software 
development was outsourced to a 
Polish subcontractor, which was 
much cheaper. The new CEO also 
prompted a new pricing structure, 
which would focus on subscription 
fees, with a highly limited “free-to-
use” offering to draw in customers.
With the software development out-
sourced, the firm had a bit of time 
to specify the software to optimize 
ease of use for customers. In addi-
tion, the firm, along with ICI, began 
describing the cost structure of the 
firm more precisely, to gain a better 
understanding of the pricing struc-
ture needed to sustain the business. 
This process was performed in par-
allel with identifying new potential 
market segments. This proved that 
the market outside NGOs was much 
larger, which caused the firm to 
change its direction to target these 
segments.
However, targeting several different 
segments, even with the same prod-
uct, brought key challenges. The 
approach for each segment could 
be different, as use of the software 
depended on the specific needs 
in that segment. Thus, proving 
the value of the software required 
insight into the specific segment. 
This issue was presented to the ICI 
ICI helped ViewWorld 
broaden its perspective, 
which eventually turned the 
firm’s focus to the potential 
inherent in other customer 
segments. 
hvem?
hvad?
hvor?
hvornår?
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Case presentations
Initially, ICI set out to challenge the proposed business model, directing 
attention to key considerations that needed to be addressed. For 
instance, why focus on NGOs when other customer segments would be 
more interested, as NGOs are traditionally highly constricted in their 
procurement policies.
Senior Advisory Board (SAB), which 
presented two possible approaches: 
either create solution demonstra-
tions for each segment or rely on 
partners to drive the demonstration 
projects and sales effort. Recogniz-
ing the need for rapid development, 
the SAB also recommended the firm 
to find a financially strong investor, 
to speed up the development even 
more, and get the software ready for 
market launch. 
As the software matured, the com-
pany further modified its business 
model, reconfiguring the approach 
to the sales channel, by seeking 
partnerships with relevant actors, 
while maintaining existing web-
based sales of the product.
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Figure 22: The viewworld business model
Figure 23: Illustration of trade promotion
Network timeframe 2012 totals 2013-2015 expectations
Revenue:  
2,920 tDKK
Revenue:  
1,545 tDKK
Projected revenue:  
2,000 -> 9,000 tDKK
Result:  
-1,932 tDKK
Result:  
-920 tDKK
Projected results:  
-1,000 -> 3,000 tDKK
FTE:  
8
Employees:  
4
Projected employees:  
6 -> 26
Investments:  
-
  Key 
 Partners
 - Acquisition of 
particular resources or 
activities
 Key  
 Activities
 - From production to 
platform/network
 Value  
 Proposition
 - Cost reduction
 Customer 
  
Relationships
 - From personal 
assistance to self-
service
 Customer  
 Segments
 - From niche to mass 
market
 Key  
 Resources
 - Intellectual
 Channels
 - From sales force to 
web-sales
  Cost Structure
 - Economies of scale
 Revenue Structure
 - From asset sale to subscription fees
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Results
The following presents the results derived 
from the ICI project. The results are di-
vided into two sections in accordance with 
ICI’s goals.
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Therefore, the first section deals with presenting the results for promoting 
trade in terms of the project’s economic impact. Thus, the success rate of 
the individual networks is also presented.
This serves as the basis for the second section, which 
deals with the learning points derived from the net-
works. To some extent, this is based on the ability of 
the ICI project to create profitable and sustainable 
businesses and business models. This section also 
delves further into the factors constituting a successful 
business model and with the development thereof. The 
learning points section also presents considerations and 
learning points related to using networks in a business 
model perspective.
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Promoting business, particularly in Northern Jutland, is part of the ICI 
project aim. Although the key economic and employee-related figures have been 
presented with each case, the following serves to aggregate these figures, to 
provide an aggregated picture of the effect of the ICI project, and the development 
of the companies.
Promotion of trade
When reading the results, keep in 
mind that these results were created 
in the hostile economic environ-
ment brought about by the financial 
crisis in 2008 and onwards. Table 3 
outlines the percentage of firms in 
Denmark started between 2004 and 
2009 that were still in business in 
2006-2010.
Cspot went bankrupt. Compared to 
the companies shown in Table 3, the 
ICI networks have a lower number 
of collapsed businesses. This is 
positive, but of course, the numbers 
in Table 3 are not easily comparable 
with the situation in the ICI project. 
One reason is that only 10 networks 
were involved in the ICI project, but 
also, not all of the companies in 
the ICI project were newly estab-
lished businesses. Thus, one would 
assume a lower rate of business 
discontinuation among ICI project 
participants compared with newly 
established businesses in Denmark 
in general.
The following presents the economic 
results of the ICI project. These 
are divided into revenue, profit, 
investments, and jobs created. The 
revenue and profit figures presented 
are solely derived in relation to the 
network project and only from the 
core firms. This is done to avoid 
revenue being counted twice, as it 
moves through suppliers. In addi-
tion, profits are counted only for the 
core firm, as these numbers are of-
ten difficult to extract from partners. 
The investments and jobs created 
are examined at the network level, to 
provide a more complete picture of 
the overall impact on job creation.
ICI Project Report
Results › Promotion of trade
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Table 3: Business demographics showing survival percentage in Denmark according to unit, 
start year, and time (www.dst.dk)
1. The timeframe the network was active during the 
ICI project. This presents the results achieved 
during the networks’ participation.
a. Combined revenue generated (core business-
es)
b. Combined profit generated (core businesses)
c. Combined full-time equivalents (FTEs) on the 
project (including partners)
d. Combined investments (also partners if they 
have invested)
2. Results for 2012 and outlook for 2013, 2014, and 
2015
a. Combined revenues (core businesses)
b. Combined profit (core businesses)
c. Combined number of employees (including 
partners where applicable)
The results are structured similarly to those of the individual networks but 
are aggregated across the networks. Similarly to the results for the single 
networks, these figures are only for developments related to ICI. 
Business Demography by unit, start year and time
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Survival percentage
Year 2004 63 56 50 45 -
Year 2005 73 63 56 47 42
Year 2006 100 77 64 53 48
Year 2007 - 100 73 59 52
Year 2008 - - 100 71 60
Year 2009 - - - 100 74
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ICI
 - Combined revenue: 30,820 tDKK
 - Combined results: -11,481 tDKK
 - Combined investments: 29,000 tDKK
 - FTE in total: 29,7
2012
 - Combined revenue: 24,945 tDKK
 - Combined results: 2,490 tDKK
 - Employees in total: 21,5
2013
 - Projected revenue: 95,000 tDKK
 - Projected results: 15,200 tDKK
 - Expected employees: 29
Res ults
2014
 - Projected revenue: 210,000 tDKK
 - Projected results: 32,900 tDKK
 - Expected employees: 32
2015
 - Projected revenue: 293,000 tDKK
 - Projected results: 56,850 tDKK
 - Expected employees: 43
Figure 24: Results summary and expected results
ICI Project Report
Results › Promotion of trade
As illustrated in Figure 25, the ICI networks have generally higher expectations 
for the coming years. If the networks can execute the expectations for the 
coming years, then the ICI project can be considered successful. If, however, the 
networks are unable to generate the growth in revenue and profits they expect, 
and instead stay on the same level as the 2012 results, the business promotion 
aspect of the ICI project is less impressive. 
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Below Table 4 briefly outlines how far the networks are in terms of internationalizing their business models.  
In other words, at least four of the networks are so far selling internationally and others are on their way to do so, as 
outlined in Table 4. 
Network International activities
Cspot ICI explored the German market and made many workshops to test the global scalability of the 
business model. As an effect of the workshops they prototyped partnerships with global businesses 
confirming that they had a globally scalable business model.
EBB The product is not on the market yet, however, a huge international potential is present.
Eye in the 
Sky
Sky-Watch continuously participates in international tenders they are invited to. Their biggest income 
presently is due to international partnerships.
Mobile 
Tracking
During the process different aspects of the business model were explored internationally and the global 
viability has been confirmed. For instance, a product based on the same business model has been 
exported to New Zealand.
Provital The international breakthrough in Norway showed which parameters in the business model that should 
be in focus in order to create a viable global business model. The product is also sold in Sweden and is 
expected to be introduced in more countries (Germany, Australia etc.) in the near future.
SAFE Initially, SAFE would like to roll out their concept internationally, but are now planning to start in 
Denmark. The project is still in the test phase.
Seafood From the start the intention was to create a simple globally scalable business model. During the 
project ICI facilitated contact with Potsdam University in order to investigate the German marked and 
analyze what would impact the business model when globalizing it. It was discovered that D-School 
at Stanford was struggling with some of the same problems overcoming small processes complicating 
the business model. This led to the “live market” test period the company is currently in, which so far 
proves that the business model is globally scalable. The first international market of attention is as a 
result of the ICI project Germany.
Space 
Creator
Since the property prices in New York, London, and Hong Kong etc. are among the highest in the 
world, the project was born with a global focus. That the key project partner Dolle already operates 
internationally points to a potential success. 
ViewWorld The name of the project disclosed the global intentions from the start. After the launch of the product 
the business model immediately proved to be globally viable as part of projects in for instance Asia and 
Africa.
The international 
potential of the networks
ICI Project Report
Results › Promotion of trade › The international potential of the networks
Table 4: The international potential of the business models
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This was done through extensive 
work in the ICI Lab, in which busi-
ness models were prototyped and 
tested in close collaboration with the 
networks, in addition to the ongoing 
dialogue with the networks concern-
ing their development possibilities. 
In that respect, a business model 
focus, rather than a product focus, 
has proven well suited for assess-
ing ideas and concepts on a more 
holistic level.
The effect of these efforts is inher-
ently difficult to quantify, due to the 
fussy nature of early business model 
development. However, these efforts 
should be viewed as part of the 
development process, which does 
not create an obvious return on in-
vestment. In that manner, discarding 
ideas and concepts is essential to 
the growth and profitability actually 
experienced by some of the net-
works. For instance, Provital initially 
experimented with several applica-
tion possibilities, which ICI helped 
narrow. In addition, the Seafood 
network considered multiple ideas 
for delivering fish to end consumers 
but, with the aid of ICI, eventually 
settled on sales through personnel 
associations.
An additional way in which ICI has 
helped the networks is in terms of 
simply defining undefined elements 
of the networks’ business models. 
As illustrated in the case descrip-
tions and business model figures, 
the ICI process helped define such 
elements. In other words, ICI helped 
explicate what the business model 
is. Instead of having the descriptor 
“unknown” in a different building 
block of the canvas, the ICI process 
helped build awareness about the 
firms’ business models.
Avoiding 
dead ends
ICI Project Report
Results › Promotion of trade › Avoiding dead ends
Although the above represents the activities undertaken by the ICI with a positive 
outcome, a large proportion of the ICI project has similarly dealt with describing, 
analyzing, and assessing concepts that eventually were discarded before further 
investments were committed.
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Table 5 presents all the networks in the ICI project and the involvement of 
each partner throughout the individual project’s development. Therefore, a 
typology is constructed that classifies each partner according to their engagement 
in the network.
Network end state
The core firm is the focal firm 
of the network. The core firm 
often represents the author 
of the original idea and the 
main driver of the develop-
ment. Accordingly, these are 
also considered the focal 
firm.
Core partners are partners 
that were heavily involved in 
the project.
Peripheral partners are part-
ners that have been involved, 
but typically in a non-inte-
grated manner. Typically, 
these consist of suppliers, 
which received full payment 
for their products or services, 
or potential customers that 
provided some inputs to the 
process.
Ideation partners are part-
ners mainly involved early in 
the process, and which have 
provided different inputs for 
the idea development phase. 
Therefore, these partners are 
distinct in that they did not 
derive business from partici-
pating in the network.
ICI Project Report
Results › Network end state
As Table 5 illustrates, many part-
ners displayed a relatively low level 
of involvement in their respective 
networks. Some partners simply 
became irrelevant to the network, 
as the concepts and ideas matured. 
This partly relates to the gener-
al aversion experienced among 
partners to invest in areas that fall 
outside their traditional business. 
Additionally, as the number of 
partners grew, coordination became 
exceedingly difficult and complex 
to manage. Consequently, devel-
opment was hindered by slow and 
complex decision processes, par-
ticularly when concepts have to ma-
ture. Other partners were envisioned 
as suppliers but proved inadequate 
by not providing cost-competitive 
solutions or by simply lacking the 
knowledge and skills needed. It 
seems that it is necessary to be 
more selective than the ambitious 
notions outlined in the beginning of 
the ICI project, stipulating networks 
of no fewer than five participants. 
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Table 5: Overview of networks involved in the ICI project (* denotes partners that were largely inactive)
Network Core firm Core partners Peripheral partners Ideation partners
Cspot  - Cspot  - JCD  - Smeden v. Allan Ravn
 - Fiels og Ko
 - Blissart
 - ShowOffMedia
EBB  - Hi-Con  - Gabriel
 - Densit
 - Adapa  - Formfiber
 - Arkitektfirmaet C.F. 
Møller
Eye in the 
Sky
 - Sky-Watch  - Enviclean (investor)  - Mekan
 - Dan Church
 - InnovationHub
 - SpaceCom
 - NetImage
Mobile 
Tracking
 - COWI  - Blip Systems  - Aalborg Cityforening
 - Aalborg Kommune
 - Visit Nordjylland
 - TDC
 - TK Development*
 - Nybolig Erhverv*
 - Nordjyllands 
Kystmuseum*
Provital  - Provital  - Kaj Larsen VVS 
(investor)
 - CoMeTas/Liqtech
 - GPA Flowsystems
 - Kemic Vandrens
SAFE  - SAFE Green Logistic  - Blach Holding (investor)  - Fasttrack software
 - Alu-Part
 - LIVA Consult
 - Andreas Hove Holding
 - Lyngsoe Systems
Seafood  - Copenhagen Seafood  - Boatech
 - Vilsund muslingefabrik
 - Maskinfabrikken 
Hillerslev
 - Centralrøgeriet
 - Clips*
 - Poul Kjærgaard
 - Santrans
 - Revisor Erik Harbo 
Larsen
 - Deloitte Financial 
Sevices
Space 
Creator
 - Dolle  - Jeld-Wen
 - Karup Partners
 - Inwido
 - Tømrerbytømren
 - Boligstil
 - NJA Møbler
 - Seluxit
 - Movetec
ViewWorld  - ViewWorld  - Dan Church Aid
 - CARE Danmark
 - Dansk Røde Kors
 - HugeLawn
 - NetImage
 - CommunicateIT
 - ProInfo
 - InnovationHub
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A network typology
To further describe the development 
of the ICI networks, Figure 26 is 
briefly introduced here. The dimen-
sions of Figure 26 relate to whether 
the networks are able to implement 
and profit from the potential they 
entail, as well as whether they are 
ready to run the related risks. The 
implicit assumption is that it is 
necessary to be able, as well as to 
dare in order to implement business 
models successfully. In other words, 
it is good to be in the upper right 
corner, and bad to be in the other 
parts of the matrix
Figure 27 illustrates how the net-
works changed during the ICI 
project in terms of their ability to 
succeed with the business model 
and willingness to take related risks.
Cspot did dare to invest a lot in 
screens, but was unable to cater 
to customer needs, for instance, 
in terms of providing impact data 
and thus scored low on the ability 
dimension. Later, Cspot was not 
willing to invest in the research 
needed to provide the needed im-
pact data. Cspot has therefore been 
plotted in the matrix as increasingly 
risk-averse. 
ICI Project Report
Results › Learning points 
Figure 25: Types of networks illustrated in terms of Disney characters
Able
Unable
Does not dare Dares
The following presents further learning points and insights from the ICI project, 
built around the core concept of network-based business models. 
Learning points
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Figure 26: Plot of the ICI networks according to ability and risk willingness
Able
Unable
Does not dare Dares
Space Creator
Mobile tracking
Eye in the Sky
EBB
Cspot SAFE
Provital
ViewWorld Seafood
EBB is a network consisting of 
larger companies that are highly 
capable within their fields. However, 
whether the network will be able to 
profit from the huge potential, which 
seems to be in place, is uncertain. 
The network has therefore been 
plotted as being able and increasing-
ly daring. 
Eye in the Sky seems, particular-
ly since Sky-Watch was created, 
increasingly able and daring. 
Mobile Tracking spent a lot of time 
arguing over who should take the 
risks. As the disputes were resolved 
it made it possible to exploit the 
strong abilities to some extent. How-
ever, the huge market potential still 
seems largely unexploited. 
Provital was initially almost too 
daring in its attempts to apply its 
membrane technology across many 
different areas and in the company’s 
sales efforts, which later proved 
unrealistic. As the company focused, 
and teamed up with a company that 
could take care of the sales process, 
Provital’s ability to implement the 
business model successfully be-
came clear.
SAFE was the perhaps the most 
daring ICI network. Although the 
viability of the concept remains un-
clear, SAFE has realized the need to 
test the concept on a smaller scale, 
before rolling it out on a large scale. 
Seafood started out being very 
daring, for instance, in relation to the 
wending machine concept based on 
a fast decision but, with the help of 
ICI, refocused the business model 
and seems to be succeeding.
Space Creator was not willing 
to take risks in the early network 
stage. When Dolle took charge, this 
changed.
ViewWorld experienced a slow start, 
similarly to Space Creator, but as the 
company refocused, it has become 
increasingly able and daring. 
Keep in mind that the companies 
involved in the ICI project differ in 
many ways. One such way concerns 
size. For big companies, whether 
they succeed with the activities 
evolving around the ICI project does 
not make or break the business. This 
is not the same situation for smaller 
companies. In other words, different 
types of support are needed in rela-
tion to the different types of compa-
nies. Small startup companies may 
have a lot of guts, but few resources, 
and perhaps few abilities to carry 
out what they intend to do. This 
is usually not a concern for bigger 
companies. At the same time, bigger 
companies may also have more lim-
itations in terms of pursuing a new 
venture such as activities in relation 
to the ICI project. Such companies 
may sometimes have to create a 
new company to provide the nec-
essary focus for a new venture. For 
instance, in relation to COWI and 
the Mobile Tracking technology, this 
could be relevant.
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Business models and related tools 
have proven useful on multiple lev-
els. For instance, business models 
have proven valuable in assessing 
products and technologies in terms 
of factors not exclusively related 
to the product itself. In this sense, 
business models may give high-tech 
businesses in particular a better 
chance of surviving, as it forces 
them to think beyond the product or 
technology itself, and consider the 
full business. For instance, Provital 
seems to have benefited in this way. 
In other words, the ICI project has 
helped along new mind sets and 
new more business-oriented ways 
of thinking. On the most basic level, 
the feedback from the participating 
companies on using the concept as 
a tool for understanding the current 
business model and as a method 
of conveying the strengths and 
weaknesses inherent to the existing 
business has been very good. Addi-
tionally, the concept has also been 
used to define the value creation 
process of a single firm, which has 
been of great value for some firms 
when explaining the tasks assigned 
to employees, giving them perspec-
tive on their role in the overall value 
creation, delivery, and capture.
For the firms focusing on develop-
ing new products, the concept has 
proved valuable as a method of 
visualizing how the entire business 
should be structured, as opposed to 
the traditional emphasis on product 
development. Additionally, the con-
cept has also helped generate novel 
business models, for instance, in the 
Seafood network. The concept also 
helped companies discard a host 
of ideas, due to their infeasibility as 
previously explained in the section 
“Avoiding dead ends.”
Last, the ICI project has provided 
insights into the challenges faced 
by incumbent firms when it comes 
to changing their existing business 
model, even if potential financial 
gains are within reach. Specifical-
ly, this was evident in the Mobile 
Tracking network, in which COWI 
was highly opposed to moving away 
from their existing up-front type of 
revenue stream to a more invest-
ment-based approach with greater 
potential gains. This is an example 
of the high degree of inertia often re-
lated to changing existing business 
models. 
As outlined initially in this report, 
the business model concept is 
often presented as a fuzzy concept, 
encompassing a range of areas and 
definitions, which, more often than 
not, overlaps with existing theoreti-
cal fields. However, business models 
are essentially practical tools, not 
philosophical monsters. Business 
model discussions must be elevated 
to a practical level. The ultimate test 
of a business model is in the market. 
Hence, it is important to realize that 
the work around business models 
often entails much trial and error. 
Use of 
business models
Business models and related tools have proven useful on multiple levels. For 
instance, business models have proven valuable in assessing products and 
technologies in terms of factors not exclusively related to the product itself.
ICI Project Report
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For the firms focusing on 
developing new products, 
the concept has proved 
valuable as a method 
of visualizing how the 
entire business should be 
structured
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Initial assumptions may not survive 
the test of the market. This makes it 
relevant to think about how to scale 
(down) the business model to make 
it possible to test it. For instance, 
the Cspot case provides an exam-
ple, in particular when the company 
approached Gigantium and real-
ized that many assumptions did 
not hold true. Sometimes it may be 
difficult to test the business model. 
For instance, in the SAFE case, it 
was not possible initially to perform 
a small-scale test of the business 
model. However, such efforts are 
often worthwhile, since they make it 
possible to realign, and reconfigure 
the business model in accordance 
with what the firm learns when test-
ing. The latest news from the SAFE 
network also points in this direction.
 
The pervading theme of the work 
with business models through the 
ICI project has been ensuring coher-
ence or alignment among the type 
of revenue stream and the business 
configuration building blocks. This 
entails matching the descriptors of 
each building block with the remain-
der of the system comprised by the 
revenue stream and overall business 
configuration. For instance, if you 
realize that your potential customers 
are reluctant to buy your product, 
because they fear your untested 
technology does not work, it may 
be beneficial to change the revenue 
stream from an asset sale type to a 
more subscription-oriented type of 
revenue stream. This means that the 
subscription type of revenue stream 
can make customers feel safer when 
buying products and services that 
rely on new and, for customers, 
somewhat untested technology. 
Asset sales, however, can seem 
risky for customers. This is a simple 
example of realignment, or reconfig-
uration of a business model.
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The need for a core firm
In retrospect, the notion of net-
work-based business models does 
not seem to have created a lot of 
value in the networks. However, the 
network activities were very bene-
ficial for the companies involved in 
surprising ways, rather than in rela-
tion to the anticipated effect of net-
work-based business models. In the 
networks, there are many examples 
of companies starting on a common 
journey, but it was difficult to main-
tain similar journeys. This should 
be seen in light of the starting point 
of the network, where no concepts 
were perhaps in place or only very 
immature goals were on the table. At 
the outset, the aim of the ICI project 
was to create network-based busi-
ness models. The emphasis is thus 
on creating a business model for the 
network, an approach perhaps most 
visible in the three networks, Eye in 
the Sky, ViewWorld, and Space Cre-
ator. Interestingly, these networks 
ended up leading to the creation of 
a central firm to manage and struc-
ture the network; see Table 2 and 
Table 5. There are many reasons to 
the abovementioned, and they are 
presented in the following.
- The network-based business 
model approach seems to add 
many layers of complexity, as the 
entire network of individual part-
ners has to agree on the configu-
ration.
- Disagreements concerning own-
ership structures in relation to 
key resources and activities.
- Including the particular issue 
concerning the fear of prema-
ture lock-in with partners
- The network approach introduc-
es significant overhead costs for 
partners to align their individual 
business models.
- Issues arise regarding the de-
cision of which partners should 
invest in necessary, but new 
to the network, resources, and 
activities, coupled with a general 
aversion to new investments.
Thus, throughout the project, it 
became obvious that a core firm that 
acts as the driver of the project, by 
specifying the other partners’ incen-
tives and engagement, is needed. 
This party has the motivation and 
will to follow through with the project 
and take the necessary risks to see 
the concept realized. Partners are 
used only when applicable. Thus, 
the core firm configures a network 
around itself. ICI has played, and 
universities in general, can certain-
ly play, a key role in such network 
configuration and reconfiguration, 
since universities are most often well 
positioned to do so.
Eye in the Sky had problems in 
terms of getting started. The com-
pany has been relatively faithful 
to its network and maintained the 
idea that it is in the network value is 
created. This being said, not much 
Business models at the 
network level
The following presents the insights gained on working with business models at the 
network level. Accordingly, it is relevant to reiterate the premise of the ICI project, 
namely, the notion of network-based business models. 
ICI Project Report
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Similarly, the Space 
Creator network had 
difficulties finding its feet 
until Dolle, after a while, 
took charge and pursued 
its concept
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Figure 27: The revised network-business model connection
happened in the network before 
Sky-Watch took on the role of core 
firm. 
Similarly, the Space Creator network 
had difficulties finding its feet until 
Dolle, after a while, took charge and 
pursued its concept, which meant 
that most of the other network 
participants became redundant. 
Thus, the network must often be 
reconfigured when a clear concept 
and goal mature. Until this happens, 
it is difficult to know which network 
participants are ultimately going to 
be part of the network and which 
network participants are not, when 
real business is generated.
A new interpretation
As shown through some of the 
ICI networks, the network-based 
business model approach had quite 
a few issues that made the concept 
difficult to execute.
Therefore, it became clear that the 
network-focused business model 
approach was not viable, as a coor-
dinating partner with the will and de-
termination to drive the central ideas 
forward was needed. In other words, 
it is more realistic to talk about busi-
ness models in relation to focal firms 
that enter into different relations with 
a range of partners, to create, de-
liver, and capture value, than it is to 
talk about network-based business 
models as such. 
To further illustrate, Figure 28 de-
picts the apparent need to orches-
trate the different business models 
of different actors in a network.
 
The Mobile Tracking network 
provides an example of how two 
companies (BLIP and COWI) can 
align their different types of reve-
nue streams around the same value 
proposition. Before the Mobile 
Tracking network, BLIP had focused 
exclusively on selling its equip-
ment to airports. This segment was 
served, by selling the equipment 
using asset sales. BLIP also signed 
“subscription service and operations 
agreements” with the same cus-
tomers. This was associated with 
considerable risk, as the company 
depended on a few large customers 
every year.
Therefore, BLIP had begun to seek 
out alternative markets, to diversify 
their business. The collaboration 
with COWI was an excellent oppor-
tunity. However, the collaboration 
was associated with significant 
trouble, namely, due to the initial 
focus of the network on tracking 
pedestrians. It was not until COWI’s 
traffic department became aware 
of the technology that a coher-
ent collaboration took shape. The 
traffic department served a different 
customer segment, which they had 
great experience with. This meant 
that they could easily quantify the 
value proposition, thus making it 
clearer. Unlike the pedestrian seg-
ment, the traffic customer segment 
had the necessary funds. Combined 
with the clear value proposition, 
this meant that they were prepared 
to pay for the data. However, two 
issues remained between BLIP and 
COWI: 
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- Neither was interested in making 
investments in the equipment 
needed up front.
- Neither was interested in chang-
ing the existing type of revenue 
stream.
However, from BLIP’s perspective, 
COWI could provide access to a 
market segment, which BLIP had 
not previously been able to reach. 
For COWI, the Mobile Tracking 
technology would be a nice addi-
tional thing to “have in the suitcase” 
and show off to customers. Thus, 
the network was kept together by 
the presumed market potential. The 
conflicts in the network were re-
solved in terms of a solution that left 
the parties’ existing revenue streams 
untouched. In that respect, they 
would present a purely subscrip-
tion-based type of revenue stream 
for COWI and, subsequently, enable 
COWI to do the same for their cus-
tomers. Internally, this in reality was 
dealt with as a payment in install-
ments over a given period. BLIP en-
sured that they would receive the full 
payment for the equipment over the 
duration of the agreement. This en-
abled the collaboration with COWI, 
as this solution avoided presenting 
COWI with direct investment, which 
the company did not want to do. In-
stead, COWI could bill the expense 
directly to customers.
Therefore, neither BLIP nor COWI 
changed their business significantly. 
BLIP simply added COWI as a sales 
channel. COWI provided significant-
ly lower sales costs per customer, 
by using the existing sales organi-
zation.
The network created a coherent 
alignment of slightly different types 
of revenue streams, which could 
serve a specific customer segment. 
Another key part of the collaboration 
was that the firms clearly defined 
which activities and resources 
should be associated with which 
partner. Thus, the case provides 
pointers for how network-based 
business models could be consid-
ered, in that they should seek to 
ensure the compatibility of the busi-
ness models alongside coordinating 
resources and activities among the 
network, to ensure that all parties 
are creating value for the concept.
The case shows that rather than 
using only the business model 
concept for describing the firm’s 
relation to customers, business 
models can also be used as a tool 
for understanding and defining sup-
plier relationships. This is relevant to 
ensure that the business models of 
the network partners are compatible 
with that of the core firm. 
Business model alignment
In accordance with the above, cre-
ating networks becomes a task for a 
core firm as illustrated in Figure 29. 
This means ensuring that business 
ICI Project Report
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Although the participating companies have profited financially from being 
part of the ICI project to different extents, the firms have all learned a 
lot in terms of how to participate in networks. This skill is valuable when 
implementing business models, although the business model may not be 
network-based as such.  
The case shows that 
rather than using only the 
business model concept 
for describing the firm’s 
relation to customers, 
business models can 
also be used as a tool for 
understanding and defining 
supplier relationships.
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Firm 1 BM
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Figure 28: Building networks around a core firm
models are compatible among the 
partners involved in terms of which 
resources and activities are provided 
by each partner and the revenue 
stream provided in return. Once the 
concept, or the activity on which 
the network is centered, is clear, it is 
much easier to see which partners 
are relevant in the network. Thus, it 
is problematic that the ICI networks 
were forced to select partners early 
on, before the concepts had been 
developed, due to the project fund-
ing requirements. One way to allevi-
ate such problems is to separate the 
networking activities into different 
phases. For instance, such activities 
could be divided between creativity 
networks and process networks 
(Harryson, 2006; Søberg, 2010). The 
purpose of creativity networks is 
to exchange knowledge and ideas 
to develop new viable concepts. 
The purpose of a process network 
is to implement such concepts. 
The conditions for participating in 
these two types of activities are not 
the same. Similarly, the expected 
outcomes should not be the same. 
In a creativity network, it is neces-
sary to be willing to share ideas and 
knowledge, to get something in re-
turn, but the framework is informal. 
However, to be part of a process 
network, a firm must be willing to 
take risks, and the collaboration with 
other companies needs to be more 
formalized. From the university side, 
a key role to play in relation to such 
activities is to invite relevant com-
panies to take part in a creativity 
network, and to be instrumental in 
terms of supporting the necessary 
reconfiguration of the network as it 
changes from a creativity network to 
a process network. 
Surprising secondary effects
Although the initial premise of the 
ICI project proved difficult, the ICI 
efforts and network activities ac-
celerated progression in the com-
panies. Sometimes, this progress 
occurred in terms of realizing early 
that something was a dead-end as 
described above, but in particular, 
ICI exposed the companies to new 
potential partners the firms would 
otherwise not be exposed to, thus 
greatly nurturing the firms’ creativ-
ity and development. In addition, 
the ICI processes made it clear to 
the participating companies that 
identifying a common position and 
interest from the get-go in a network 
is difficult. It is often only identified 
as you go. So what we need to learn 
is how to get there faster. This is 
actually what most of the networks 
used the ICI process for. The project 
has helped accelerate firms’ indi-
vidual business models, surprisingly 
well. To the best of our knowledge, 
this insight is new, which is relevant 
to keep in mind in similar future 
projects.
 
Although the participating com-
panies have profited financially 
from being part of the ICI project 
to different extents, the firms have 
all learned a lot in terms of how to 
participate in networks. This skill is 
valuable when implementing busi-
ness models, although the business 
model may not be network-based 
as such.  
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Conclusions
As stated in the beginning of this report, 
business models have been defined as “the 
rationale of how an organization creates, 
delivers and captures value” (Osterwalder 
and Pigneur, 2010; 14). 
This definition is difficult to operationalize, 
and therefore, another definition was 
created. 
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When using business models in relation to business 
partners, it makes more sense to strive for synergy be-
tween compatible business models rather than a shared 
business model. The initial premise in the ICI project 
of network-based business models did not find much 
empirical support during the course of the project. How-
ever, the ICI project helped accelerate the development 
of the individual businesses taking part in the different 
networks. For many of the companies involved, being 
involved in the project has resulted in surprising, initially 
unintended, but positive secondary effects. 
This definition focuses on value capture, in the sense that the definition 
emphasizes the type of revenue stream and its interaction with the business 
configuration. This definition has a pragmatic appeal, and thus represents 
a valuable outcome of the ICI project. 
Promotion of trade
In 2012, the combined revenue of the 10 networks 
was DKK 24.945 M in relation to the activities fo-
cused on in relation to the ICI project. The related 
profits were DKK 2.490 M. In terms of employ-
ment, the project, by the end of 2012, generat-
ed 21.5 FTEs. The networks anticipate that this 
will grow during the coming years to combined 
revenues of DKK 293 M, combined profits of DKK 
56.850 M, and 43 FTEs in 2015.   
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Limitations
The scope of this report has mainly been 
presenting the results derived from work-
ing with business models in networks, with 
a specific emphasis on the business model 
concept as the guiding premise. Therefore, 
the above has presented the results through 
this specific lens, to provide a concise and 
focused report. 
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Certain problems experienced within 
the networks may also be attribut-
able to the way the networks were 
formed. The companies involved 
chose who to collaborate with. 
Many of the partners in the networks 
can be characterized as suppli-
ers. This represented a significant 
hurdle throughout the project, as the 
suppliers were not inclined to enter 
into more complex collaborations 
involving investments in the net-
work. Conversely, some networks 
attempted to engage potential cus-
tomers in the process. However, this 
also often proved difficult, as the 
potential customers expected some 
sort of clear incentive to participate. 
It was difficult to define how the 
partners’ business potential for par-
ticipating would unfold. The issue of 
making partners contribute can, in 
that respect, be attributed to a lack 
of trust regarding whether the other 
parties will reward the contribution 
in the longer term.
On a similar note, not all networks 
were equally well acquainted before 
they started collaborating. The 
notion of network-based business 
models is more feasible in relation 
to networks characterized by higher 
degrees of trust, while dealing with 
lower degrees of risk than found in 
many ICI networks. The networks 
involved in the ICI project to a large 
extent consisted of inexperienced 
actors often heavily involved in new, 
inherently risky, product or process 
development. It may be particularly 
difficult to make ends meet and cre-
ate network-based business models 
for new products and services that 
are not yet ready to go to market. 
This may be even more true when 
collaborating with new partners. 
Thus, the inherent conclusion in 
this report discouraging the notion 
of network-based business mod-
els should be seen in light of the 
particular challenges facing these 
networks. In relation to more mature 
companies with well-established 
products and processes, and net-
works, creating truly network-based 
business models may be easier. 
Whether this is the case requires 
further research. 
The ICI networks are different from 
other business networks in the 
sense that their inception to some 
extent has been funded by the 
compensation provided through ICI. 
This instigates an “artificial” element 
in this report and the related results. 
Therefore, the ICI project offered 
some monetary compensation for 
the partners’ participation. Thus, the 
early “soft” part of the process was 
often easy to initiate, as most firms 
were willing to spend some time 
exploring potential new ideas in a 
somewhat philanthropic manner. At 
the end of the day, it is easier to be 
philanthropic when the compensa-
tion is apparent.
Although the findings suggest the 
relevance of ensuring compatible 
business models among the part-
ners in networks, the issues of how 
diverse business models are made 
compatible requires further research 
and other projects.
However, through the ICI project, other themes have emerged. Some of 
these, while not specifically related to business models, appear to play a 
part in business model work. Accordingly, as these themes do not fit under 
the scope of the report as a whole, they are included here. 
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Advice to 
managers
The purpose of this final section is to ex-
tract practical advice for managers about 
business models in networks.
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Thinking in terms of revenue 
streams provides a good outset for 
thinking in new business models. 
This thinking can foster a more 
radical rethinking of a firm’s tradi-
tional business model. However, the 
revenue stream should be coupled 
with the rest of the business con-
figuration to provide a coherent 
configuration. In that respect, a sin-
gle firm should continuously assess 
whether the chosen business model 
is sufficiently aligned with the mar-
ket conditions, while ensuring that 
the type of revenue stream is tightly 
coupled with actual value creation 
for customers. 
Taking the viewpoint of a single firm, 
the challenge of building a business 
model in a network is ensuring that 
different business models in the 
network are compatible to facilitate 
collaboration between the partners. 
A core firm of the network is likely 
needed to drive this process. In 
addition, during the process the lim-
itations that the preexisting business 
models create must be considered.
Whenever possible, whether as-
sumptions implicit in new business 
models or reconfigurations are cor-
rect should be tested. For instance, 
people with relevant industry expe-
rience can be engaged to help out 
in this way, but ultimately, business 
models are tested in the market. 
Preferably, a business model is 
scalable and thus can be tested on 
a small scale before further invest-
ments are made. 
On a pragmatic level, building 
business models in networks is 
concerned with making ends meet, 
in terms of engaging the right re-
sources and activities across actors 
to create the value proposition 
envisioned. The product or service 
therefore guides the complemen-
tarity. This means that the value 
proposition, which the network 
wishes to deliver, acts as the guiding 
principle for which mix of partners 
is relevant. In other words, who is 
in and who is out of the network? 
For a network to not only create 
value but also be able to capture 
and distribute it among the partners, 
compatible business models need 
to be in place. The core challenge 
of business models in networks can 
be summed up as one of maxi-
mizing relevant complementarity 
among the network partners without 
jeopardizing business model com-
patibility. This means it is necessary 
to put great effort into analyzing and 
describing the existing business 
models of the different companies/
partners. Their motivation for partici-
pating in a shared network or project 
should also be assessed. 
The business model concept provides a useful method of thinking more 
in terms of business compared to thinking in products. A good starting 
point is to create the story of the business, starting with where and how 
customers purchase the product, describing all the previous steps in 
procuring, manufacturing, and delivering the actual product. The goal 
here is to understand the link between the revenue stream and the business 
configuration.
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